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The Failed Superiority Experiment
Christine P. Bartholomew*
Federal law requires a class action be "supcrior to alternative methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." This superiority
requirement has gone unstudied, despite existing for half a century. Thia Article
undertakes a comprehensive review of the superiority case law. It reveals a
jurisprudence riddled with inconsistency as courts adopt diametrically opposed
interpretations of the requirement. Originally crafted to encourage predictable,
consistent class action decisions, superiority has mutated over the years into a
dangerous wild card-subjectively used to stymie aggregate litigation. The
solution is not adding a new requirement to the already onerous rules for class
certification. Instead, judges should rely on existing yet currently underutilized
case management tools and abandon the failed superiority experiment.
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INTRODUCTION
Class actions are under attack. Once lauded as powerful
mechanisms to deter predatory business behavior and supplement
regulatory enforcement, they are now targets for tort reformers and
conservative jurists.1 From the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act 2 to a
string of recent Supreme Court decisions, 3 the trend is towards
increasingly restrictive interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), the rule governing class certification of monetary
claims. 4 The legal academy has already addressed many of these key
assaults. 5 Yet one has gone virtually unnoticed. Unprincipled
interpretations of Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement are an
existential threat to the class action regulatory scheme.
Under the superiority requirement, courts can only certify a
class when it is "superior to alternative forms of adjudication." 6
Congress adopted superiority to ensure the controlled growth of class
1. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475,
1475-76 (2005); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731
(2013); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Rcflcctions on thc Dcformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 314 (2013).
2. Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).
3. E.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
5. E.g., Christine P. Bartholomew, Saving Charitable Settlements, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
3241, 3242 (2015); Tyler W. Hill, Financing the Class: Strengthening the Class Action Through
Third-Party Investment, 125 YALE L.J. 484, 487 (2015); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 ILARV. L. REV. 486, 488 (2012);
Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic
Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 296-300 (2014); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment
on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 81 (2011);
Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2356 (2015).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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actions through "case-by-case experimentation." 7 Now fifty years later,
judges are reaching diametrically opposed, irreconcilable
interpretations of superiority even in analogous cases.8
Two recent false advertising actions in different circuits
illustrate the problem.9 Both involve nationwide classes. Both concern
dietary supplements. Both share the same legal theories. Both cover
purchasers unlikely to have kept receipts or other evidence of purchase.
Despite these similarities, the circuits splinter on superiority. 10 The
Seventh Circuit granted class certification;11 the Eleventh Circuit
denied it.12
These are not isolated examples.1 3 Rather than consistently
applying the requirement, courts infuse superiority with a conflicting
assortment of factors, stripping away any cohesive screening function. 14
For example, some courts require plaintiffs to establish multiple
factors, while others weigh them.15 Some courts only consider judicial
alternatives, while others consider administrative and legislative
7. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 subcommittee completion notes Dec. 2, 1963 [hereinafter
Completion Notes] (discussing how superiority would permit "casc by case enperimentation") (on
file with author).
8. Compare, e.g., In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 699-700
(N.D. Ga. 2008) (applying a restrictive superiority analysis), and Berther v. TSYS Total Debt
Mgmt. Inc., No. 06-C-293, 2007 WL 1795472, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2007) (same), with, e.g.,
Quiroz v. Revenue Prod. Mgmt., Inc., 252 F.R.D. 438, 445 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (defining superiority
generously), and In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J.
1997) (same).
9. Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015); Karhu v. Vital Pharms.,
Inc., 621 F. App'x 945, 947 (11th Cir. 2015).
1n C,,, tii Af,lli,,, 795 F ., .it 650 (affirm;, , , ti ,d finding ,i, , is), ,,
Karhu, 621 F. App'x at 917 (affirming denial of certification in part because of lack of superiority),
11. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658.
12. Karhu, 621 F. App'x at 947.
13. Compare, e.g., Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1090 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (defining superiority narrowly and declining certification), with, e.g., Ortega v. Nat. Balance,
Inc., 300 F.R.D. 422, 426 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (defining superiority broadly and granting certification).
14. Compare, e.g., Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(allowing certification), with, e.g., Rowden v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 581, 587 (C.D. Cal.
2012) (noting that in this case "it is simply not credible to argue that a class action is the 'superior'
method").
15. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997).
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options.16 Still other courts decide superiority based on the individual
amount at issue,17 while others focus on the wealth of the plaintiffs.18
Additionally troubling are the judicial interpretations of
superiority that foreclose class actions for small sum cases. 19 These
cases are essential for private enforcement of consumer protection laws,
ranging from the Sherman Act, to Truth in Lending, to consumer
product defect and mislabeling claims. 20 Yet as a practical matter, few
litigants have the financial wherewithal to bring individual suits, and
often such cases are not worth the cost it takes to bring them.21
Given that significant and pervasive problems stem, in part,
from Congress's mandate of "case-by-case experimentation," 22 this
Article argues the superiority experiment failed. Part I starts with the
origin of superiority. Then, relying on over three hundred federal
decisions, it summarizes the judicial inconsistency applying the
requirement. Part II explores why this disagreement exists. It explains
how courts' unfettered discretion allows them to define superiority by
selecting from three conflicting policy goals-resulting in radically
divergent interpretations. Part III proposes to cure the inferiority of
superiority by eliminating the requirement.
I. SUPERIORITY: ORIGIN AND CHAOS
The superiority requirement was enacted as part of Congress's
attempt to clarify and create more predictable class action decisions.
The original 1933 version of Rule 23 "mean[t] different things to
16. Compare In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (defining
superiority to conoidor solely adjudicatory alternatives, not private recall efforts), and In re
Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 293 F.R.D. 21, 34-35 (D. Me. 2013) (same),
with Daigle v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. No. 09-3214 (MJD/LIB), 2012 WL 3113854, at *6 (D. Minn.
July 31, 2012) (defining superiority to consider defendant's administrative private recall).
17. Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 263 F.3d 394, 416 (5th Cir. 2001), withdrawn, 281 F.3d 477 (5th
Cir. 2002).
18. Walter v. Hughes Commc'ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
July 6, 2011).
19. Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015) ("[H]eightened
ascertainability ... gives one factor in the balance absolute priority, with the effect of barring class
actions. vwhcru Cld6 tIlatmcilt is often most neded: in cascs iniolhing relatifely luw-cost goods or
services ... ").
20. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (2012).
21. Statement on Behalf of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 7 (1965) [hereinafter
Statement].
22. See Completion Notes, supra note 7.
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different persons."23 In 1966, the Rule 23 Subcommittee, a division of
the Civil Rules Committee, sought to remedy this uncertainty. 24 The
Committee saw an "insistent demand and need" for class actions, 25
recognizing that without such mechanisms "access to the courts may be
put out of reach for those whose individual stakes are low or who by
reason of poverty or ignorance will not go it alone." 26 The Rule 23
amendments were enacted in response to this demand, outlining the
criteria making a claim eligible for class certification; however, rather
than clarifying, superiority has confused the certification inquiry. This
Part details how. It first identifies deficiencies with the requirement's
statutory language and legislative history then shows how they fuel
judicial dissonance.
A. The Superiority Requirement
The 1966 Amendment created Rule 23(a), a set of prerequisites
for all class actions. 27 Once met, the class must satisfy one of three
distinct categories set out in Rule 23(b). A (b)(3) class, the most common
category for certification and the only one at issue in this Article,
permits monetary damages. Rule 23(b)(3) has only two requirements:
predominance and superiority. 28 Predominance means "the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members." 29 This is the primary battleground
for certification decisions. Consequently, and perhaps not surprisingly,
23. Charles W. Joiner, Rule 23 Subcommittee Member, Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-A Step Forward at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Judicial
Conference Third Judicial Circuit of the United States (Sept. 12, 1964) (transcript on file with
author).
24. Statement, supra note 21, at 7.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These are (1) numerosity (a "class [so large] that joinder of all
members is impracticable"), (2) commonality ("questions of law or fact common to the class"), (3)
typicality (named parties' claims or defenses "are typical ... of the class'), and (4) adequacy of
representation (named plaintiffs and class counsel "will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class"). Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
12992016]
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scholars30 and the Supreme Court 31 have actively shaped the contours
of the predominance requirement. Additionally, every circuit court has
weighed in to clarify predominance. 32
Superiority is the oft-overlooked sibling of predominance. For
superiority, the court must find "that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy." 33 Like predominance, this requirement is reviewed solely
for abuses of discretion. 34 However, unlike predominance, little
scholarship comprehensively discusses superiority, 35 and Supreme
Court guidance is scant. While the Roberts Court has actively reviewed
class actions, those decisions address issues other than superiority. 36
30. See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. J. INT L L. 751, 751
(2012); Alex Parkinson, Comcast Corp v. Behrend and Chaos on the Ground, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
1213 (2014); Ryan Patrick Phair, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law Problem" in Rule 23(b)(3)
Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 862 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196-97 (2013);
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).
32. See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2015); EQT Prod. Co. v.
Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 366 (4th Cir. 2014); In re Johnson, 760 F.3d 66, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Abdullah
v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2013); Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
718 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2013); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 814
(7th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009); In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008); Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay
LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 535 (6th
Cir. 2008); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2008); Monreal v. Potter,
367 F.3d 1224, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004).
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
34. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d
283, 316 (3d Cir. 1998); Muzuco v. Re$ubmitlt, LLC, 297 F.R.D. 504, 521 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
35. To date, class action scholars have focused narrowly on isolated superiority questions.
See, e.g., Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority Requirement and Transnational Class
Actions: Excluding Foreign Class Members in Favor of European Remedies, 34 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (focusing narrowly on transnational class actions); Andrea Joy Parker,
Dare to Comparc: Dctcrmining What "Other Available Methods" Can Be Considered Under Federal
Rule 23(b)(3)'s Superiority Requirement, 44 GA. L. REV. 581, 583 (2010) (addressing superiority's
alternative methods of adjudioation language); Jon Rombcrg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and
Superior to None: Clas3 Certification of Patih'alw Isues Uadc/ Rule 23(c)(4)(u), 2002 UTAH L.
REV. 249, 250 (discussing how the superiority analysis applies in more rare issue, not damages,
class actions). This Article is the first to undertake a comprehensive analysis of judicial
interpretations for each of the five aspects of the superiority rcquircmcnt.
36. See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 666 (2016) (discussing effect of
class action settlement); Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1188 (predominance); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (class action arbitration waivers); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) ((b)(2) classes). The only recent mention of superiority was in
dicta. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 363 (noting cryptically that in monetary class actions superiority is
not "self evident" with respect to each class member's individualized claim for moncy).
SUPERIORITY
Rule 23(b)(3) does not define superiority. Instead, courts
consider five factors. The first, "alternative methods," considers "other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." 37 The remaining four are from Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D):
(b)(3)(A) the individuals' interests, (B) pending litigation, (C) forum,
and (D) manageability. 38 This Section provides a rough primer, showing
how each factor generates more questions.
Superiority decisions frequently begin with the "alternative
methods" analysis. 39 The text of the statute and Committee Notes
support comparing a class action to individual methods of "adjudicating
the controversy." 40 Nonetheless, some courts consider non-litigation
alternatives. 41 Further, neither the rule nor legislative history explains
how superior a class action must be to available alternatives.
The four enumerated factors trigger more conflict. For
"individuals' interests," courts consider "the class members' interests in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions."42 While acknowledging such interests are minimal in cases
involving "small" amounts of recovery, the Comments direct courts to
consider individuals' interests in "carrying [their own litigation] on as
they see fit."43 The Comments offer no further guidance on what
constitutes a "small amount" or the tipping point for when such
interests preclude certification. They then blur the distinction between
predominance and the individuals' interest analysis, noting these
interests may be "theoretical rather than practical" in cases with "a
high degree of cohesion."44 Hence, what types of individuals' interests
should be considered-separate and apart from predominance-are
37. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(b)(3).
38. Id. at (b)(3)(A)-(D).
39. Id. at (b)(3).
40. Id. ("[A] clas action i3 superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy." (emphasis added)); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee notes
to 1966 amendments ("[Alnothcr method of handling the litigious situation may be available whioh
has greater practical advantages. Thu- one or more actions agreed to by the parties as test or
model actions may be preferable to a class action; or it may prove feasible and preferable to
consolidate actions."); see also In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2011)
("It is not as if the Supreme Court and other participants in the rulemaking process ... used the
word 'adjudication' loosely to mean all ways to redress injuries.").
41. See infra Part I.B.2.
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
43. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee notes to 1966 amendments.
44. See id.
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unclear.45 In application, courts consider a range of differing interests,
from the amount in controversy to the wealth of individual class
members.
The pending litigation factor's focus is two-fold and considers: (1)
the "extent" of pending litigation and (2) the "nature" of such
litigation.46 For extent, the Comments state, "[T]he court should inform
itself of any litigation actually pending by or against the individuals,"' 47
but do not explain how that information affects certification. Similarly,
for nature the Comments solely note: "Also pertinent is the question of
the desirability of concentrating the trial of the claims in the particular
forum by means of a class action, in contrast to allowing the claims to
be litigated separately in forums to which they would ordinarily be
brought."48
Rule 23(b)(3)(C) switches the focus from pending litigation to the
appropriate forum. 49 Courts consider "the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the. claims in the particular forum "50
This forum factor invites a comparative analysis between the
advantages of the pending forum and other courts where individual
claims could be brought.51 The purpose of this factor and the degree of
comparative advantage needed is unstated.
The last factor in Rule 23(b)(3) is manageability, whereby courts
consider "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action." 52 This is the only aspect of superiority the Supreme
Court has addressed-though giving the topic short shrift. In Amchem
v. Windsor, the Court held that a settlement class need not satisfy
manageability, though the Court never addressed the other superiority
factors. 53 Even for manageability, though, Amchem leaves many
unanswered questions. There are frequently "likely difficulties in
managing a class action,"54 begging the question at what point do such
difficulties tip the scale towards denying an otherwise viable class
45. For example, the Committee Notes cite an essay by Professor Chaffee. The relevant pages
discuss the challenges individualized issues pose to aggregate litigation-issues squarely relevant
to prcdominancc. ZECIIARLUI CIAFEE JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 274 (1950).
46. Id.
47. Comment to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
48. Id.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C).
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id. at (b)(3)(D).
53. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997).
54. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
1302 [Vol. 69:5:1295
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claim? Further, which difficulties count?55 Should choice of law issues
matter? What about the potential disproportionality of damages to
harm or the challenges identifying potential class members (what some
courts call ascertainability)? 56
This general background only unmasks a fraction of the
problems with defining superiority. The next Section delves more
deeply into jurisprudence, exploring the judicial strife in answering the
questions left by the superiority requirement's text and legislative
history.
B. The Sordid Superiority Landscape
After enactment, the Subcommittee imposed a thirty-year
moratorium on revising class action rules. 57 During that period, courts
were left to sort out superiority. As detailed below, it was not long before
they adopted different, often inconsistent, positions. These
disagreements transcend simple factor-by-factor, temporal, or
geographic groupings.58 Instead, a cleaner approach is to group the
jurisprudence as splits regarding: (1) financial considerations, (2)
litigation options, and (3) judicial economy.
1. Money and Superiority
With money comes disagreement. As courts decide superiority,
financial considerations generate the first area of judicial dissonance.
Primarily, judges wrestle with the potential recovery by individuals and
total payouts by defendants. Though not expressly mentioned in the
requirement, judges import these issues into both individuals' interests
under Rule 23(b)(3)(A) and manageability under Rule 23(B)(3)(D).
To begin, courts differ on whether the amount at stake should
decide the individuals' interests factor. For some courts, individual
financial gain is irrelevant: "the mere fact that claims could be asserted
55. Id.
56. See infra Part I.B.2.
57. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 509 (5th ed. 1994); Back to
the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class Action and the Limits of Rule 23, 109 HARv. L. REV. 828,
845 (1996).
58. Even in the same circuit, courts adopt notably different superiority analypeo. Compare,
e.g., Xavier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (defining
superiority narrowly), with, e.g., Ortega v. Nat. Balance, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 422, 426 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(defining superiority broadly).
13032016]
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independently is not a reason to defeat class certification. '" 59 These
courts focus on collective action gains-such as avoiding disparate
results and sharing litigation costs. 60 These gains outweigh individuals'
interests, particularly given opt-out procedures. 61
Other courts consider the amount at stake. These courts
repeatedly acknowledge that small individual claims support
certification 62 but reach sharply opposing conclusions about what
counts as "small."63 Some courts hold thousands of dollars in individual
gross recovery are still best handled through class actions.6 4 The
question there shifts from whether the amount at issue is small to
whether it is "not large."65 These courts presume certification promotes
an individual's interests and require some affirmative showing to the
contrary to deny certification on superiority grounds. 66 For other courts,
59. Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 296 F.R.D. 261,271 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Fort Worth
Emps.' Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 301 F.R.D. 116, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same).
60. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1988) ('The procedural
device of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action was designed not solely as a means for assuring legal
assistance in thc vindication of small claims but, rathcr, to achicvc the cconomics of timc, effort,
and oiponoo.'); see also Hornandoz v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd
without opinion, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); Buford v. Am. Fin, Co., 333 F. Supp. 1213, 1260
(N.D. Ga. 1971).
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
62. Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010); Pastor v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 487 F.3d 1042, 1047 (7th Cir. 2007); Herkert v. MRC Receivables
Corp., 254 F.R.D. 344, 353 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("The policy at the very core of the class action
mochanism is to overcome the problem that small rccoverics do not providc thc inccntivc for any
individual to bring a solo action prosocuting his or hor rights," (internal citation omitted)); scc also
Edward F. Sherman, Claso Actions and Duplicativc Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 512 (1987) ("The
dcsihc of indi-idual class riemiabers tu Lultiul their uwn suiLs uarties litle weight in class atiuns
involving small amounts of money.").
63. Class actions involving statutory caps are similarly split. Compare, e.g., Jones v. CBE
Grp., Inc., 215 F.R.D. 558, 570 (D. Minn. 2003) (lacking superiority because of the de minimis
amount involved), with, e.g., Warcholek v. Med. Collection Sys., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 291, 295-96 (N.D.
Ill. 2006) (finding superiority despite a damages cap that meant de minimis individual recovery).
64. See, e.g., Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 244 F.R.D. 469, 480-81 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff'd,
571 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2009) (granting certification of a class where class representatives had
claims worth millions); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1988)
(certifying action involving sri figure and million dollar recoveries); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1997) (tens and hundreds of thousands of
dollars in individual damages).
65. "Not large" individual damage amounts support superiority. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix
Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001); In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD
Prods. liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 1982) (ahrogated on other grounds by Valentino v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996)).
66. See, e.g., Michaud v. Monro Muffler Brake, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00353-NT, 2015 WL
1206490, at *5 (D. Me. Mar. 17, 2015) (finding superiority satisfied because class members have
not indicated "an interest in bringing separate actions").
SUPERIORITY
only net-zero cases-where the cost of individual litigation exceeds the
potential recovery-justify certification.6 7
Courts further splinter on the individuals' interests factor in
claims involving mixed financial stakes. If a few class members'
potential recoveries are large-even if the majority of the class's
individual recoveries would be net-zero--some courts deny superiority.
For example, in Walter v. Hughes, the Northern District of California
denied certification for a class that alleged an Internet provider
misrepresented download speeds. 68 In finding a lack of superiority, the
court summarily concluded that while, "it is true that the settlement
contemplates awards of $5 and $40 to class members. . . , the named
Plaintiffs seek $5,000, a considerably higher amount [suggesting] the
class's claims may be large enough to justify individual actions."6 9
Other courts take a contrary position on the individuals' interest
factor. For example, the Southern District of New York found
superiority in a putative class action where some but not all class
members' recoveries would be significant.70 The court explained,
"[Plaintiff] has demonstrated that the small-size investments of some
members of the Proposed Class would make individualized lawsuits
impracticable for those investors."71
Whether to consider class members' personal wealth further
divides courts. Some presume interest in individual suit when class
members could potentially afford litigation. 72 Other courts reject class
members' wealth as irrelevant. As one court explains, "Rule 23 has no
restriction on wealth."73 Consequently, the individuals' interests factor
leads to contrary superiority findings, even in analogous cases. 74
67. Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 263 F.3d 394, 416 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding the absence of a negative
value suit "a significant detraction from the superiority of the class action device"), withdrawn,
281 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2002). Other courts take an even more extreme stance. For example, in
Berther v. TSYS Total Debt Management, the Eastern District of Wisconsin found a lack of
superiority in a case involving a mere $1,000 recovery per class member. No. 06-C-293, 2007 WL
1795472, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2007) ("[The court finds no reason to conclude that a maximum
of $1,000 would be insufficient to motivate an individual plaintiff to pursue private litigation.").
68. Walter v. Hughes Commc'ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
July 6, 2011).
69. Id.
70. Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 296 F.R.D. 261, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
71. See id.
72. Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *10.
73. In re Revco Sec. Litig., 142 F.R.D. 659, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
74. Compare In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1334,
*3 (D. Ariz. 1979) (finding suporiority in part bocauco tho prico fixing claim would benefit the
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Different takes on potential financial recovery also cloud the
manageability analysis under Rule 23(b)(3)(D). Shifting from class
members' recovery to the defendant's potential payout, some courts use
manageability to weigh the proportionality of statutory damages
against the actual harm suffered.7 5 Though neither the legislative
history nor the text of the rule supports this analysis, it often arises in
consumer protection cases involving statutory damages, such as the
Truth in Lending Act's one hundred dollar fine per violation. In a class
action, the per-person fine would be aggregated across the class up to a
cap. Given the large potential exposure, some courts use superiority to
screen out such claims.7 6 For example, in Ratner v. Chemical Bank of
New York Trust Co., 77 the Southern District of New York denied class
certification. It was undisputed the defendant in the case violated
statutory law by failing to disclose the annual percentage rate on
outstanding credit card account balances for approximately 130,000
clients.78 Regardless, the court held a class action was not superior to
individual lawsuits because of the large exposure the defendant faced
for its admitted wrongdoing.7 9
In contrast, other courts reject proportionality arguments as
outside the manageability evaluation.80 They view Rule 23 simply as a
procedural device, one that does not alter congressional intent.81 These
public at large), with In re Transit Co. Tire Antitrust Litig., 67 F.R.D. 59, 76 (W.D. Mo. 1975)
(denying superiority due to how time consuming the price-fixing litigation would be).
75. See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 776 (3d Cir. 1974); Ratner v. Chem.
Bank N.Y. Tr. Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also David B. Farkas, Out of Proportion,
L.A. LAW., Sept. 2014, at 34 ("Judicial response to this issue in such cases has been anything but
uniform.").
76. See, e.g., Evans v. U-Haul Co. of Cal., No. CV 07-2097-JFW (JCx), 2007 WL 7648595, at
*7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) ("[P]otential for abuse is [one] reason why maintenance of a class
action is not superior ... in cases ... where there is an enormous contrast between the huge
liability ouffcred by Defendant and the leok of harm ouffored by Plaintiff.").
77. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
78. See id. at 413-14.
79. See id. at 416.
80. Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010); Murray v. GMAC
Mortg. Corp., 434 F. 3d 948, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2006).
81. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985); Murray, 434 F.3d at 954 ("[I]t is not
appropriate to use procedural devices to undermine laws of which a judge disapproves." (citation
omitted)); Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456, 461-64 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, these courts consider
proportionality after a full evaluation of the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Holloway v. Full
Spectrum Lending, No. CV 06-5975 DOC (RNBx), 2007 WL 7698843, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 26,
2007) ("Any constitutional infirmity stemming from a disparity between the actual harm and the
amount of damages awarded is properly addressed if, and when, damages are awarded."); see also
Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[fIt may be that in a
sufficiently serious case the due process clause might be invoked, not to prevent certification, but
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courts reason that if Congress wanted to prohibit class actions, it would
have either articulated such a prohibition in the statute or capped
aggregate claims.8 2
This discord over financial considerations means superiority
depends on the judge. This inconsistency grows over questions of
litigant choice.
2. Litigation Options and Superiority
Superiority jurisprudence is further divided on how much to
preserve diverse redress options for absent class members.
Representative litigation necessarily compromises an individual's
ability to control the adjudication of his legal rights.8 3 Neither the
history nor the text of superiority offers guidance on weighing a
theoretical interest in control against the benefits of collective suit.8 4
Struggles to find this balance splinter superiority's manageability and
alternative methods analyses.
To begin, judicial concerns about adjudicating individuals' legal
rights without their affirmative assent complicate the manageability
factor. Some courts impose an "ascertainability" requirement onto
manageability, though the term itself does not appear in Rule
23(b)(3)(D). 8 5 Ascertainability's meaning radically varies, with judges
adopting contrary positions regarding what this assessment covers8 6
to nullify that effect and reduce the aggregate damage award.... At this point in this case,
however, these concerns remain hypothetical.").
82. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (total
recovery may not exceed "the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the
[defendant]"); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012) (same).
83. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1654 (2008) (discuscing autonomy issues in class actions), But see Joshua
P. Davis et al., The Puzzle of Class Actions with Uninjured Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858,
870 (2014) (diecuosing how class actions promote autonomy by "putting in place the result that
class members would be apt to choose").
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment (stating courts would
"consider the interests of individual members of the class in controlling their own litigations and
carrying them on as they see fit"); see also Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356,
391 (1967) ("will and ability to take care of himself').
85. See Erin L. Geller, The Fail-Safe Class as an Independent Bar to Class Certification, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2778 (2013) (discussing this implicit requirement).
86. Stephanie Haar, Class Is in Session: The Third Circuit Heightens Asccrtainability with
Rigor in Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 59 VIHL. L. REV. 793, 804 (2014) (describing ascertainability's
"malleable" nature).
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and how ascertainable class members need to be.8 7 Ascertainability has
assumed three meanings: (1) identifying class members "using objective
criteria; (2) capturing all members necessary to resolve the action in a
single proceeding; and (3) describing the main claims and defenses that
apply to the class."8 8 However, proof of class membership may be
difficult to come by. Consumer cases are common examples, as class
members may not retain proof of purchase, such as receipts.
Despite this difficulty, many courts treat administrative
problems identifying class members as insurmountable,8 9 while others
grant certification. Preserving class members' potential options is less
important to these latter courts. They either reject the ascertainability
requirement or reframe the inquiry slightly: so long as the class
definition is sufficiently clear to identify affected individuals, a class is
ascertainable.90 According to these courts, a contrary interpretation
would mean "there would be no such thing as a consumer class action."91
87. Ascertainability concerns first appeared in the 1980s. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670
(7th Cir. 1981); see also Daniel Luks, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name That Class
Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2388-93 (2014) (discussing the policy considerations behind
this split).
88. Haas, supra note 86, at 804.
89. See, e.g., Stewart v. Beam Glob. Spirits & Wine, Inc., No. 11-5149 (NLHIKMW), 2014 WL
2920806, at *7 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014) (noting, in a suit alleging deceptive marking claims against
the producers of Skinnygirl Margarita mix, that putative class members would almost certainly
be incapable of recalling the dotails of every purchase, the price of purchases, or frequencies of
purchases without relying on speculation); Carrora v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013)
(noting that conducting "mini-trials" to ensure that every class member purchased WeightSmart
dietary supplement would not be "administratively feasible"); Weiner v, Snapple Beverage
Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,2010) ("Plaintiffs suggest
that after certification, the Court could require that '[c]lass members produce a receipt, offer a
product label, or even sign a declaration to confirm that the individual had purchased' a Snapple
bcverage within the class period. This suggestion, to cay the least, is unrealistic."); see also Marcus
v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining the ascertainability
requirement eliminateo serious adminietrativo burdens by "insisting on the easy identification of
class members").
90. See, e.g., McCrary v. Elations Co., No. EDCV 13-00242 JGB (OPx), 2014 WL 1779243,
at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) ("[I]t is enough that the class definition describes a 'set of common
characteristics sufficient to allow' a prospective plaintiff 'to identify himself or herself as having a
right to recover based on the description.' "); Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal.
2013) (noting that it would be an insurmountable hurdle to consumer claps action if clacs actionE
could be defeated at the class certification stage simply because membership is difficult to
ascertain); see also Kinder v. Dearborn Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 10-12570, 2011 WL 6371184, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2011) ("Due process does not ... require actual notice to each party ....").
91. Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Courts adopting
this pooition aloe cite concerns about incentivizing defendants to limit rcordkeeping, See, e.g.,
Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 240, 250 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ("[D]eclining to
certify a class altogether, as defendants propose--would create an incentive for a person to violate
1308
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Similarly, potential redress options also muddle analyses of
"available methods for... adjudicating the controversy. ' 92 Whether
alternative methods include arbitration or other private compensation
schemes depends on the judge.93 Courts that see these alternatives as
superior prefer individualized decisionmaking, 94 even when such
alternatives provide lesser relief than a class claim. For example, in a
recent putative class action against Ford for a defective torque
converter, the District Court of Minnesota denied superiority, instead
finding Ford's voluntary refund program sufficient.95 The court openly
acknowledged "that certain class members will not be fully reimbursed
through the recall" as some class members paid for a full transmission,
but the refund only covered the cost of a converter. 96
At the same time, other courts treat refund programs and other
private compensation schemes as outside the superiority analysis. 97
These courts strictly abide by the "adjudicative" language in the
statute98 and recognize that the existence of other options does not
trump private rights of action. 99
the TCPA on a mass scale and keep no records of its activity, knowing that it could avoid legal
responsibility for the full scope of its illegal conduct.").
92. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
93. Compare In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 699-701 (N.D.
Ga. 2008) (finding refund for contaminated peanut butter a superior form of resolution), with
Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 610 (E.D. La. 2006) ('The analysis is whether the
class action format is superior to other methods of adjudication, not whether a class action is
superior to an out-of-court, private settlement program.").
94. See, e.g., ConAgra, 251 F.R.D. at 699-700; In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab.
Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 621-22 (W.D. Wash. 2003) ('To this day, defendants maintain refund and
product replacement programs for individuals .... It makes little sense to certify a class where a
class mechanism is unnecessary to afford the class members redress.").
95. Daigle v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. No. 09-3214 (MJD/LIB), 2012 WL 3113854, at *6 (D. Minn.
July 31, 2012).
96. Id.
97. As one court explains, such programs require comparing the gains of a class action to
such private options-a kind of "abstract economic choice analysis" precluded by the text of the
rule and supporting legislative history. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 293 F.R.D. 21, 34 35 (D. Mo. 2013). To there courts, a contrary interpretation undermincs
the collective gains of classwide resolution. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon,
910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 920 (E.D. La. 2012), aff'd sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790
(5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the relevance of a private settlement fund, as it would "bar the possibility
of any clas-wido Fettloment"). For more on the probloms with voluntary refunds, see generally
Anita Bernstein, Voluntary Recalls, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 359, 390-96.
98. See Parker, supra note 35, at 599-600 (discussing how a textual reading supports
focusing solely on adjudicative alternatives).
99. See, e.g., White v. E-Loan, Inc., No. C 05-02080 SI, 2006 WL 2411420, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 18, 2006) (rejecting the argument that FTC enforcement would be superior to the putative
class action); see also Amalgamated Workers Union v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 478 F.2d 540, 543 (3d
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Thus, similar to financial concerns, how much to protect
litigants' options clouds superiority. Instead of systematic, predictable
interpretations, courts draw contrary conclusions based on judicial
preference.
3. Judicial Economy and Superiority
A third divide in superiority jurisprudence forms around
defining judicial economy, namely when certifying a class action
achieves "economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote[s],
uniformity of decision.., without... bringing about other undesirable
results." 100  Broadly construed, concerns about judicial economy
threaten to preclude any class action, given such cases inherently use
significant judicial resources. Delineating when to expend such
resources impacts both the manageability and the pending litigation
factors. 101
First, as previously discussed, the manageability factor directs
courts to consider "the likely difficulties in managing a class action." 10 2
Courts inconsistently calibrate the amount of difficulty they are willing
to tolerate. 103 As Allan Erbsen notes, "Absent some principled guidance
for determining whether a management device is substantively
acceptable-which Rule 23 currently does not provide-analysis of
manageability is as likely to create problems as it is to prevent them."10 4
For example, courts differ greatly on choice of law challenges. In
cases with class members from multiple states, courts must identify the
governing law.10 5 While the predominance requirement addresses
Cir. 1973) ("As we view it, it would appear that [Rule 23(b)(3)] was not intended to weigh the
ouperiority of a clam action againot posoiblo adminictrativo roliof.").
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendment.
101. Differing views on judicial economy also impact how courts define non-adjudicative
alternatives. See, e.g., Patton v. Topps Meat Co., No. 07-CV-00654(S)(M), 2010 WL 9432381, at *10
(W.D.N.Y. May 27, 2010); Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
102. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
103. See, e.g., Bertulli v. Indep. Ass'n of Cont'l Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2001); Mullen
v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 630-31 (5th Cir. 1999) (Garza, J., dissenting)
(analyzing the district court's failure "to consider the difficulties posed by the
plaintiffs'. .. allegations'); Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting
judges' reliance on "Rule 23(c)(4)(A)'s severance procedure to structure unwieldy class action
lawsuits").
104. Allan Erbsen, From "Predominance" to "Resolvability" A New Approach to Regulating
Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REv. 995, 1070 (2005).
105. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 pushed more nationwide classes into federal courts
without addrcsing the rcoulting choico of law iccuos. Class Action Fairnocr Act of 2005, Pub. L.
109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also Elizabeth
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choice of law, some courts revisit it under manageability. For some,
claims involving the laws of multiple states automatically make a class
unmanageable. 10 6 Other courts recognize class actions are necessarily
challenging, so manageability "will rarely, if ever, be in itself sufficient
to prevent certification of a class." 10 7 These courts use case management
tools (subclassing, phased trials, bifurcation, or statistical sampling) or
adopt choice of law approaches that minimize manageability concerns
(such as an "interest analysis" or applying the law of the defendant's
home state).108 Often this broader definition of manageability is a
Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 674 (2013); Miller, supra note 5, at
299.
106. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018
(7th Cir. 2002) ("Because those claims must be adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions,
a single nationwide class is not manageable."); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 674
(7th Cir. 2001) (discussing how a nationwide case presents manageability concerns); Lichoffv. CSX
Transp., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 564, 574 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (noting application of six states' laws "would
make it burdensome to instruct a jury on the legal standards, for plaintiffs' claims"); see also James
E. Pfander, The Substance and Procedure of Class Action Reform, 93 ILL. B.J. 144
(2005) (suggesting the prospect of differing state substantive laws "often persuades federal judges
to reject nationwide class treatment as unwieldy").
107. Klay v Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004); see also In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting "failure to certify an
action under Rule 23(h)(1) on th- nle ground thpt it would he inmnArgeqb1 is lisifavored"); Glen
v. Fairway Indep. Mortg. Corp., 265 F.R.D. 474, 482 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (stating that "'dismissal for
management reasons is never favored' because class actions are meant 'to permit plaintiffs with
small claims and little money to pursue a claim otherwise unavailable.'" (quoting In re Workers'
Comp., 130 F.R.D. 99, 110 (D. Minn. 1990))); DeLoach v. Philip Morris Cos., 206 F.R.D. 551, 567
(M.D.N.C. 2002) ("Though any case of such magnitude certainly poses problems of
manageability.... dismissal for management reasons, in view of the public interest involved in
class actions, should be th exception rather thai1 th tulu." (inLtual citatiu, and quotations
omitted)).
108. See, e.g., In re Nigeria Charter Flights Contract Litig., 233 F.R.D. 297, 306 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (discussing how differences in state law "should not deter certification of a class"); Simon v.
Philip Morris Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing courts use of subclasses and
uniformity of state law in class actions); Graham v. Knutson Mortg. Corp., No. CT 94-11043, 1996
WL 407491, at *6 (D. Minn. June 18, 1996) (stating that applying the laws of various states would
not be "a particularly unmanageable tack"); see also Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Rote for
Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 220 (1998) ("A thoughtful, reasoned analysis ... could
legitimately result in applying the law of the defendants' home state to determine liability for
conduct based claims ... "); Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice of Law
Problem of Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 394
(2011) (arguing that the "use of average law ... replicates the functional consequences and effects
that would be obtained under the benchmark process of applying the differing laws separately,
qtsfc hy stev"). For a thorough discussion of theso diffprpnt methods, se Fdward F. Shermsn,
Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25
REV. LITIG. 691 (2006).
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comparative one.1 09 As the Eleventh Circuit states, "[W]e are not
assessing whether this class action will create significant management
problems, but instead determining whether it will create relatively
more management problems than any of the alternatives."' 10
Depending on the approach, the outcome of certification differs
greatly. Take, for example, two notably similar antitrust cases, one in
Tennessee and one in Florida.11 ' Both involved state antitrust law
claims. Both involved allegations of unlawful interference with the
entry of a generic drug. Both were brought by indirect purchasers with
multistate claims. In the Tennessee case, the court denied certification,
holding a nationwide case would require application of the law of
multiple states, thus "render[ing] this class simply unmanageable."1 1 2
In the Florida case, though, the court granted certification, noting the
variation "does not pose a manageability problem because the
applicable substantive laws are virtually identical in their required
elements."1 1 3
Different line-drawing regarding judicial economy also plagues
the pending litigation factor. 114 While some courts only consider
pending class actions that have not been consolidated,1 15 others adopt a
more granular approach, analyzing the status of the pending litigation.
In these courts, only advanced litigation or those that adversely affect
the pending case are relevant. 1 6 In direct conflict, other courts require
109. See, e.g., 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.32, at
279 (4th ed. 2014) ("Rtde 23(b)(3) permits a class d nia] for !ack of siiperiority only when other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy actual exist.").
110. Klay, 382 F.3d at 1273.
111. In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555 (E.D. Tenn. 2014); United
Wis. Servs. v. Abbott Labs. (In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 220 F.R.D. 672 (S.D.
Fla. 2004).
112. See Metaxalone, 299 F.R.D. at 588.
113. Terazosin, 220 F.R.D. at 700 n.45.
114. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B) (requiring judges to make certification determinations on
"the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against
class members").
115. See Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 385 (N.D. Ill. 1982). One court has gone further to
only consider cases involving the same parties. Rosales v. El Rancho Farms, No. 1:09 cv 00707
AWI-JLT, 2012 WL 3763955, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012) ("Though there are related actions
pending, the parties have not identified any other actions involving the parties in this case.").
116. See, e.g., Lopez v. Orlor, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 35, 41 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding superiority
despite the eistence of one other case and a companion state case because "[c]ertification here will
not adversely affect these related cases"). This analysis looks at various factors, such as claims
implicated, if the other litigation is also a putative class, and the status of any other litigation. See,
e.g., Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360, 396 (D. Ariz. 2013) (finding superiority despite pending
EEOC claim for overlapping discriminatory misconduct because the EEOC case was in ite infancy).
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existing cases to ensure certification of the proposed class does not
merely serve to create "lawsuits where none previously existed."117 Still
others require not just existing cases, but also prior tried class actions.
Under this line of authority, for so-called "novel claims," ' 8 the lack of
similar prior litigation precludes superiority because of judicial
economy concerns.11 9 As one court stated:
If there existed a prior track record of trials in these types of cases, the Court would be
able to make a more accurate determination as to judicial efficiency. The Court could refer
to the actual issues and problems that arise in these cases, instead of being forced to
speculate as to what these issues and problems may be. Additionally, individual trials in
these cases may winnow out many of the individual issues that are now before this Court.
After individual trials are conducted in these cases, the courts will have the necessary
information to make a thoughtful and logical superiority determination. At this time,
however, plaintiffs cannot produce enough information to establish the superiority of a
class action. 120
Initially, this interpretation existed only in mass tort, but it has crept
into other substantive areas.1 21 In this creep, it is particularly difficult
to reconcile courts' differing approaches. For example, Carpenter v.
BMW involved alleged misrepresentations regarding certain models'
117. Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
118. This approach is sometimes called the immature tort theory. See, e.g., Laura J. Hines,
The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 579 (2004); William N. Reed &
Bradley W. Smith, HMO Class Actions: How to Kill a Gnat with a Howitzer, 69 Miss. L.J. 1181,
1212 (2000).
119. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[C]ertification of an
immature tort results in a higher than normal risk that the class action may not be superior to
individual adjudication."); Neely v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-00569, 2001 WL 1090204, at *12
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2001); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig., 177 F.R.D. 360, 375
(E.D. La. 1907) (noting that "[if] the cause of action [is] immature in the sense that there is no real
track record of resolution of similar claims, [an important question informing analysis is] will it
create manageability problems'); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 203, 212 (S.D. Oh.
1996) ("[prior] trialo are imperative [for superiority]"); When a claim is no longer "novel" is unclear.
As one scholar explains, "[No objective reference exists by which a court can ascertain the number
of claims necessary to constitute maturity. This indeterminacy will needlessly complicate an
already intricate inquiry." Recent Cases, Class Actions-Class Certification of Mass Torts Fifth
Circuit Decertifies Nationwide Tobacco Class, 110 HARV. L. REV. 977, 980 (1997).
120. Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 495-96 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citation omitted).
121. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 192 (3d Cir. 2001),
(noting in a securities class action that "maturity alone is neither necessary nor sufficient for
certification, but it may help to ensure that class certification is 'superior to individual
adjudication.'"); Crutchfield v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, No. 13-4801, 2014 WL
346111, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 2011) (finding lack of superiority based on no track record in case
involving claims of damage from faulty construction). This creep is partly attributable to the
Manual for Complex Litigation, which implies that some "appellate review of novel legal issues"
must exist before a court can certify a case with "novel" claims. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
§ 33.26 n.1057 (3d ed. 1995).
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transmissions. 122 In denying class certification, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania relied in part on the lack of prior class actions
adjudicating nationwide misrepresentations. 123 Yet, the very same
year, a few states away, the Northern District of Illinois addressed an
analogous nationwide class action also for alleged misrepresentations,
this time involving car wax.124 Without any track record discussion, the
court granted certification, focusing instead on the lack of other pending
litigation.125
Unfortunately, the divides continue in other aspects of the
analysis, even beyond judicial economy and the prior two categories
spelled out above.1 26 As the next Part explains, the reasons for these
divides show how deeply rooted the problems are with superiority.
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE SUPERIORITY CONFUSION
As Part I establishes, with each new superiority question, courts
reach contrary interpretations. While this background is a precursor to
rethinking the requirement, any remedy must also consider the sources
of the strife: namely, why jurisprudence has metastasized into conflict.
This Part diagnoses what ails the superiority requirement. Some
conventional answers do not work. For example, the divides do not
match the amount at stake: even in small sum cases courts disagree. 27
Nor do the divides align by claim. Rather, courts adopt different
superiority interpretations within a single area of law. 128 Political
122. Carpenter v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-CV-214, 1999 WL 415390, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. June 21, 1999).
123. See id. at *6-7.
124. Garner v. Healy, 184 F.R.D. 598, 599 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
125. See id. ("[T]here is no evidence that any other actions involving this controversy and
these parties have been filed elsewhere.").
126. One such divide occurs in the forum factor, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C). Compare Hanlon
v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding (b)(3)(C) satisfied since "[n]o
particular forum stands out as a logical venue for concentration of claims"), with Haley v;
Medtronic, 169 F.R.D. 643, 653 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("Indeed, plaintiffs have not even established that
the vast majority of the individual lawsuits that have boon filed or that will be filod -should be
brought in the [forum].").
127. Compare, e.g., Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 540-41 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(allowing certification), with, c.g., Rowdon v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 581, 587 (C.D. Cal.
2012) (nutifig that in this case "it is simply nut cr-diblc to arguc that a class action is the 'superior'
method").
128. Compare, e.g., In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555, 588 (E.D.
Tenn. 2014) (interpreting superiority using conflict of laws analysis), with, e.g., United Wis. Servs.
v. Abbott Labs. (In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 220 F.R.D. 672, 700-01 (S.D. Fla.
2004) (interpreting superiority using manageability analysis).
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affiliations also fail to explain the divides, as judges appointed by the
same president diverge.129
Rather, other causes better account for the fractured superiority
opinions. First, the requirement lacks sufficient contours to guide
interpretation, inviting courts to define superiority as they choose.
Second, the policy goals behind Rule 23(b)(3) conflict, allowing judges
to reframe the analysis based on their opinions of class actions. Finally,
one of these policies, efficiency, further splinters interpretations.
Combined, these attributes go a long away to explain the current chaos
in superiority jurisprudence.
A. The Problem with Abdication
This Section explains how the Rules Committee took an overly
broad-brush approach to drafting-contrary to its intended goal in
amending the rule. This abdication of rulemaking responsibility is then
compounded by decades of minimal judicial review.
Ideally, superiority would facilitate predictability and
certainty. 130 Rather than different rules for different claims, a
procedural rule should generally work transsubstantively-applying
equally regardless of the claims at issue. 131 These features minimize
129. For example, the Honorable Thomas W. Thrash Jr. and the Honorable Eldon E. Fallon,
both Clinton appointees, define superiority differently. Compare In re ConAgra Peanut Butter
Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 699-700 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (defining alternative methods
broadly), with Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 610 (E.D. La. 2006) (defining
alternative methods narrowly). Thus, it is unsurprising that politics do not explain the divides.
Most of the dissonance is at the district court level. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES 253 (2013) (discussing how political affiliation plays only a "small role at the
district court level").
130. See, e.g., CENTRIA v. Alply Architectural Bldg. Sys., LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00079-CWR-LRA,
2012 WL 73235, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012) ('The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exist to
promote order and predictability in litigation ...." (citing Watkins Ludlam Winter & Stennis, P.A.
v. DynaSteel Corp., No. 3:10-CV-00656-CWR-LRA, 2011 WL 976592, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 17,
2011))); Yitshak Cohen, Issues Subject to Modification in Family Law: A New Model, 62 DRAKE L.
REV. 313, 333-34 (2014) (discussing "the general values of civil procedure, such as effectiveness,
certainty, finality, and predictability").
131. See, e.g., Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing
how procedural rules "take a one-size-fits-all approach"); see also David Marcus, The Past, Present,
and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010)
(describing the principle of trans-substantivity and noting that "[t]he vast majority of the Federal
Rules are trans-substantive").
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arbitrary decisionmaking 132 and allow the parties to evaluate ex ante
the viability of pursuing claims. 133
The 1966 Amendment was meant to serve these functions.
Frustrated by the inconsistent interpretations riddling earlier class
action rules, the Rules Committee enacted a revision aimed at more
predictably shaping the controlled growth of class actions, as mentioned
in Part 1.134 As Arthur Miller, an informal reporter for the Amendment,
explains: "The Committee had an overarching theme-that the liberal
joinder of parties and claims was desirable ... ,"135 This is echoed by
Benjamin Kaplan, the official reporter: "[I]t did not escape attention at
the time that it would open the way to assertion of many, many claims
that otherwise would not be pressed; so the rule would stick in the
throats of establishment defendants."1 36 While the Committee debated
how far to liberalize class action procedures, it recognized the need for
aggregate litigation. Such joinder advanced access to justice by
"enabling small people with small claims to vindicate their rights when
132. See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 858 (1984) ("For the skeptics,
consistency assuages anxiety about arbitrariness. Even if the result is not correct, at least everyone
is treated the 'same.' Consistency promotes equal treatment of individuals, thereby expressing the
rhetoric of democracy, of 'equality before the law.' ").
133. See Z.W. Julius Chen, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and
Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1462-63 (2008) (explaining how predictable
procedure rules provide the parties "gains from knowing the likely outcome of a potential claim
because risk can be gauged ex ante, while thc lawmaker necessarily intends a specific result when
he grants a substantive right or promulgates a procedural rule to facilitate the realization of that
right"); Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. ECON. REV.
311, 313 (1988) (positing that litigation is not filed when clear law makes probable fate of claim
known).
134. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 401 (2014) ("The modern American class action rule
emerged during a period of celebrated liberal legislative initiatives intended to expand the civil
rights and liberties of ordinary American citizens."). The motivation for this liberalizing intent has
long since been debated, with some pointing to private redress goals and others emphasizing larger
social benefits. Compare Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669 (1979) ("[Tjhe draftsmen
conceived the procedure's primary function to be providing a mechanism for securing private
remedies .... "), with Charles Gibbs, Consumer Class Actions After AT&T v. Concepcion: Why the
Federal Arbitration Act Should Not Be Used to Deny Effective Relief to Small-Value Claimants,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1345, 1361 (discussing how the history of the amendment indicates larger
goals than redress, including deterrence).
135. Miller, supra note 5, at 296 ("Perhaps it was inevitable since those who found themselves
the object of large-scale class actions aggregating claims that previously were economically
unviable and facing cases having monetary dimensions that hitherto were unthinkable mobilized,
gained strength, and counterattacked.").
136. Benjamin Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2126-27 (1989).
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they could not otherwise do so." 13 7 The primary asterisk to this theme
of liberalizing class action procedures was mass torts, which the
Committee disfavored for class treatment.138
Unfortunately, the aim of the amendment and the text of the
superiority requirement clash. The Committee elected a "case-by-case
experimentation" approach to certification decisions. 139 The legislative
history for Rule 23 notes, "In the present incubating stage of the
development of methods to deal with multiple litigation, it would be
unwise to introduce stiff rules excluding judicial discretion."1 40 John P.
Frank, one of the only members of the Rule 23 Subcommittee to express
reservations about such unbridled discretion, cautioned, "[A]ll such
judgments have to be made not by super men but by run of the mine
[sic] lawyers who may in a particular instance be judges whose personal
experience may fall far short of the judgment of this degree of
sophistication."1 4 1 His warning proved accurate: this abdication of
rulemaking has allowed unpredictability and inequity to seep into
judicial decisionmaking. 142
Case-by-case experimentation does not necessarily spell
disaster.143 Ideally, the interpretations of superiority would "gradually
close in," much as other aspects of the Rule 23 analysis have.1 44 But how
137. Statement, supra note 21, at 5.
138. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendment ("A 'mass
accident' reculting in injuries to numerous persons, is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action
because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability ... would
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted
nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.").
139. See Completion Notes, supra note 7; see also Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, 474
F.2d 336, 344 (10th Cir. 1973) (discussing how Rule 23 invites case-by-case determinations).
140. Completion Notes, supra note 7.
141. Letter from John P. Frank, Member, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Benjamin
Kaplan, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Feb. 21, 1963) (on file with author).
142. Jennifer E. Spreng, Failing Honorably: Balancing Tests, Justice O'Connor and Free
Exercise of Religion, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 837, 877 (1994) (discussing how granting unconstrained
discretion is "unpredictable and occasionally even inequitable in practice"); aee also Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989) ("[T]he trouble with the
discretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it does not satisfy ... justice very
well. When a case is accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the
system of justice is to be respected, not only that the latter case be differcnt but that be seen to be
SO.").
143. As Judge Aldisort explains; "Case by case development allows operimentation because
each rule ic ro.ovaluatod in subsequent cases to determine whether it produces a fair result. If it
operates unfairly, it can be modified." Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Honorable Ralph Cappy:
Distinguished Keeper of the King's Bench Tradition, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 482 (2009).
144. Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement is a good example. Courts concur that "no
definite standard exists as to the size of class that satisfies the numerosity requirement." Morrow
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the Committee drafted the rule thwarts the evolution towards clarity.
The problems begin with the structure of the requirement. Multifactor
balancing tests invite contradictory weighing of relevant factors. 145
They also allow courts to selectively apply factors, thus producing
inconsistent results-the very problem plaguing superiority
jurisprudence. 146 This problem is then exacerbated by the lack of
precision as to what each factor in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) means. 147
Finally, appellate courts have abdicated their responsibility to create
uniform interpretations of superiority.
The Committee Notes only complicate the superiority
requirement by adding further openings for contrary interpretations. 148
For example, the Notes state a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) is
appropriate when certification is "convenient and desirable."'149 What is
convenient, though, is a question of perspective. 1 °
For an absent class member, a class action is more convenient
than individual litigation, thus suggesting a generous definition. 151
Absent class members can wait until the case is resolved while their
rights are asserted in a representative fashion. Their inconvenience is
then limited to making a claim against any settlement or judgment. 152
v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 190 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 160 (5th
Cir. 1980)). Nonethele3, over time, courts have reached an agreement on a general range that
meets the requirement. See, e.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th
Cir. 1999) (100 to 150 members generally satisfies numerosity); Rex v. Owens, 585 F.2d 432, 436
(10th Cir. 1978) (numerosity satisfied in classes with as few as seventeen to twenty members);
Chauvin v. Chevron Oronite Co., 263 F.R.D. 364, 368 (E.D. La. 2009) (numerosity satisfied with
class well over 100 members).
145. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address-Conference on Compelling Government
Interests, 55 ALB. L. REV. 535, 544 (1992) (discussing how balancing tests can be unpredictable).
146. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Require Adherence to the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165,
1173 (2008) (explaining how multifactor tests that are not firmly anchored in concrete legal rules
produce irregular interpretations).
147. See infra Part I.A.
148. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 98 (1969)
("Plans, policy statements, and rules are three facets of essentially the same thing; all are designed
to clarify and to regularize the purpose of the governmental activity.").
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendment.
150. Cf. Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Tr. Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Students of
the Rule have been led generally to recognizo that its broad and open ended terms call for the
exercire of some considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature.").
151. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 109, at § 18:22 (noting class actions benefit plaintiffs
by allowing for sharing of expenses between other class members); Mullenix, supra note 134, at
409 (noting class actions benefit plaintiffs by allowing class members to aggregate claims).
152. As a RAND report on class action explained:
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In contrast, though, for the assigned judge, a class action is less
convenient than individual litigation, thus suggesting a more
restrictive definition of superiority. Class actions require significant
judicial oversight. 153 In the majority of putative class actions, few, if
any, have filed individual suits. 154 Consequently, only in rare cases will
the aggregate individual claims before a single judge alter the
convenience calculation. 155 But at the same time, it may be more
convenient for the judiciary as a whole for a single judge to hear related
matters, again supporting a more generous definition of superiority.
156
The Notes provide no guidance on how to reconcile these competing
perspectives and the resulting contrary interpretations.
The Committee Notes also ambiguously suggest superiority may
vary with the substantive law at issue, though the hedging language
only flirts with the idea without consummating its import. 157 For
example, the Notes support certification of small stakes claims and
antitrust cases. Yet, the Notes fail to reconcile this idea with the vague
text of the superiority requirement. 158
Most individuals are too preoccupied with daily life and too uninformed about the law
to pay attention to whether they are being overcharged or otherwise inappropriately
treated by those with whom they do business. Even if they believe that there is
something inappropriate about a transaction, individuals are likely just to "lump it,"
rather than expend the time and energy necessary to remedy a perceived wrong.
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE
GAIN 68 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 2000).
153. See Catherine A. Rogers, When Bad Guys Are Wearing White Hats, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX
LITIG. 487, 497 (2013) (discussing the role of judges in class actions). Class actions require judges
to wear two hats: one judicial and one fiduciary-serving as arbiter while protecting the rights of
absent class members. See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit
as an Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1028-29 (2003) (analyzing examples of the Supreme
Court providing close judicial scrutiny to protect the interests of absent class members).
154. See, e.g., Kelen v. World Fin. Network Nat. Bank, 295 F.R.D. 87, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (no
pending cases); Baghdasarian v. Amazon.com, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 383, 390 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (same).
155. Asbestos cases are a primary example. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp.
415, 422-24 (J.P.M.L. 1991); P.D. Carrington, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Delay in
Court and Premature Adjudication, in THE LAW'S DELAY: ESSAYS ON UNDUE DELAY IN CIVIL
LITIGATION 69, 77-80 (C.H. van Rhee ed., 2004).
156. See, e.g., In re Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:05CV1064 HEA, 2010 WL 5149270, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 13, 2010) (focusing on the judiciary as a whole); U.S. ex rel. Hockett v. ColumbiaHCA
Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 38 (D.D.C. 2007) (same).
157. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398-99
(2010); John B. Oakley, Illuminating Shady Grove: A General Approach to Resolving Erie
Problems, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 79, 87 (2010).
158. Statement, supra note 21, at 5 (listing antitrust cases as illustrations of (b)(3) classes
and discussing the Committee's interest in "enabling small people with small claims to vindicate
their rights...").
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Thus, textually, superiority leaves judges "free from the
constraints which characteristically attach whenever legal rules enter
the decision process."159 This means that a key function for a civil
procedure rule-maintaining the rule of law through predictability and
consistency-is lost.
Unfortunately, superiority also suffers from a second level of
abdication: a lack of review-restraining oversight.160 By failing to draft
clear rules, the Committee left the judiciary to sort out the mess. 161
Rather than accepting this responsibility, the Supreme Court and
circuit courts have repeatedly taken passes during the last five
decades-focusing more on questions of predominance than
superiority. 162
For other aspects of Rule 23, "review of class action
determinations for abuse of discretion does not differ greatly from
review for error." 163 However, for superiority, circuit courts adopt a
159. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971); see also David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence
Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937, 941 (1990). Certainly, drawing the fine line between discretion and
rigid rules is a problem beyond superiority. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 141-42 (Martin
Ostwald ed. & trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (n.d.); see also, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 148, at 25-26;
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 144-47 (1986) (striving to balance case law and legislation);
JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY 143-
44 (1986) (emphasizing individual considerations rather than abstract rules); H. L. A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 19 (1961); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 98 (1991).
160. See George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 749; see also Scalia,
supra note 142, at 1178 ("The common-law, discretionary-conferring approach is ill suited,
moreover, to a legal system in which the supreme court can review only an insignificant proportion
of the decided cases.").
161. The Rules Committee is responsible for drafting the rule (and thus revising it to cure
deficiencies). See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1128-30 (2002) (explaining the Supreme Court only
provides a pro forma review of draft rules).
162. This may be because predominance is more outcome determinative than superiority.
Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, 11 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 4 (June 2012)
(dcscribing predominance as "the most important requirement" for (b)(3) claees); William H. Page,
Introduction: Reexamining the Standards for Certification of Antitrust Class Actions, ANTITRUST,
Summer 2007, at 53, 54 n.2 ("[Tihe requirement of predominance is most often decisive."). But see
Daniel F. v. Blue Shield, 305 F.R.D. 115, 129-30 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (satisfying neither predominance
nor superiority). Often cases that lack superiority have difficulty satisfying other aspects of Rule
23. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying certification for lack
of both predominance and superiority); Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 663 (M.D. Fla. 2010)
(same).
163. Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983).
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particularly deferential variant of the abuse of discretion standard. 164
Circuit courts frequently reaffirm discretion rather than clarify the
requirement. 16 5 In the rare instance when a circuit court does reverse,
the guidance in the case is limited-noting the trial court's failure to
consider some factor or addressing a minor aspect of a single factor
rather than holistically discussing the requirement. 166
Protecting discretion above clarity is particularly clear in a
recent Fifth Circuit opinion. 167 There, the Court upheld a trial court's
finding without addressing a circuit split in defining superiority for Fair
and Accurate Credit Transaction Act ("FACTA") cases.168 As the Court
noted:
Critically important here is the broad discretion enjoyed by district courts regarding
certification. That discretion may lead to disparate results. In fact, the parties' briefs
make clear that district courts have both allowed and refused certification of classes in
the FACTA context. Nevertheless, we concur with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that
"inconsistent results" regarding certification are "no insurmountable objection" and must
be permitted "until, if ever, some more acceptable and general solution by amendments
to the Rules or clarification by statute emerges."
16 9
This limited review is often coupled with unpublished or
otherwise unciteable decision designations. Thus, when one court
interprets a particular superiority factor in an unpublished opinion,
another court cannot rely on that decision.1 70 Instead, the court
164. See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 77 (2000) ("Clearly there is no such thing as one
abuse of discretion standard.., this standard of review more accurately describes a range of
appellate responses." (emphasis added)); see also Rudolph F. Pierce, Esq. & Jennifer M. DeTeso,
Esq., A Lawyer's Lament: Unpredictability and Inconcistency in the Wake of the Daubcrt Trilogy,
2 SEDONA CONF. J. 163, 170 (2001) (diccurcing how abuoce of diocrotion standardo perpctuatc
"inconsistencies and severely hamper[ ] the ability of appellate courts to develop guidelines of
general applicability for trial courts and the trial bar"). Superiority differs from other procedural
rules or statutes, where an abuse of discretion is statutorily defined. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(e)(4)(D) (2012) (immigration rulings); 12 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2012) (appointment of
conservator); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) (discretion of court to receive verdict from eleven-person jury
after one juror has been dismissed). This contributes to the lack of rigorous review.
165. See, e.g., Ticknor v. Rouse's Enters., L.L.C., 592 F. App'x 276, 277 (5th Cir. 2014)
(affirming district court did not "abuse its broad discretion"); N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Rali
Series 2006-QO1 Tr., 477 F. App'x 809, 813-14 (2d Cir. 2012) (same); Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co.,
509 F.2d 205, 210-11, 213 (9th Cir. 1975) (same).
166. See, e.g., Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009) (reversing
"extremely cursory" finding of superiority); Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188, 191
(4th Cir. 2006) (reversing for not analyzing pending litigation).
167. Ticknor, 592 F. App'x at 277.
168. Id. at 279.
169. See id. (citations omitted).
170. See, e.g., Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, 44
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 733-35 (2008) (noting that "most commentators, attorneys, and judges
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reanalyzes the factor anew. This lack of review, plus the initial lack of
a clear rule, undermine superiority's ability to predictably, consistently,
guide the controlled growth of class actions. 171
It is unrealistic, and perhaps undesirable, to eliminate all
judicial discretion, 172 but rules should temper it.173 While judges have
significant freedom to decide many procedural aspects of a case,
including case management or electing potential remedies,1 74 such
unchecked authority makes little sense for a "death knell" procedural
rule-one that can make or break a case.1 75 Unfortunately, this dual-
level abdication is only one of multiple problems for the requirement.
Superiority's conflicting goals also sustain judicial division, as
discussed next.
accept the proposition that unpublished opinions are not binding to any degree on thQ court');
Erica S. Weisgerbcr, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97
GEo. L.J. 621, 647 (2009) (noting that "[courts] may subsequently depart from the rules or holdings
in those prior unpublished opinions").
171. Unpublished opinions hinder the growth of "coherent, consistent and intelligible body of
caselaw." Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001); see David R. Cleveland,
Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 169 (2009) (describing survey where judges attributed inconsistencies
in law to "inconsistency between published and unpublished opinions or a lack of circuit decicionc
on point"); Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate
Opinions: A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One
Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REV. 217, 228 (2006) (discussing how non-precedential dispositions hinder
decisionmaking). In this way, superiority is an example of the "habit of allowing discretionary
power to grow which far exceeds what is necessary and which is much loss controlled than it should
be." DAVIS, supra note 148, at 20.
172. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1580-81 (2010) (discussing the benefits of judicial
discretion); Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 43, 88 (2012) (same).
173. See DAVIS, supra note 148, at 42 (discussing the need "to confine, to structure, and to
check necessary discretionary power").
174. See, e.g., 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 580 (2016) ('The trial court has inherent
authority to control and manage the litigation ... including sound discretion to control
discovery."); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge's Equitable Discretion Following Ebay v.
Mercexchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 72-74 (2007) (discussing judicial discretion in deciding between
injunctive and monetary relief).
175. See In re Nat'l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 577 (3d
Cir. 2014) ("Denial of certification can toll the death knell in actions that seek to vindicate large
numbers of individual claims." (citing COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (1997))).
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B. Conflicting Goals and Consequential Inconsistency
Abdication of rulemaking responsibility only partly explains
opposing superiority interpretations. The rule's legislative history also
reveals multiple, irreconcilable policy goals. At one point, the
Committee identified three goals: to advance judicial economy, to
promote the private enforcement of substantive law (particularly in
cases involving small individual recovery), and to increase judicial
consistency. 176 Elsewhere, the comments highlight themes of access to
justice. 177 But the legislative history also indicates competing autonomy
and efficiency concerns. 178 These conflicting policy goals are further
complicated by superiority's twin references to efficiency and
fairness 179-concepts often at odds.
Multiple policy goals for a single rule are not facially
problematic. However, competing goals invite interpretative
problems.180 The more policy goals, the more difficult it is to reconcile
or prioritize such goals.181 As this Section details, courts can arbitrarily
select a particular policy justification to ground a particular conclusion.
This reverse-engineering reaches its apex when courts decide
superiority based on efficiency.
176. Statement, supra note 21, at 5; see also Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class
Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 671 (2014); Kaplan, supra note 84, at 391.
177. Statement, supra note 21, at 7 ('If separate litigations are always required, then access
to the courts may be put out of reach for those whose individual stakes are low or who by reason
of poverty or ignorance will not go it alone.").
178. See id. at 4 ("The revision.., also pays more attention to problems of management and
procedural fairness ....").
179. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that "a class action [be] superior ... for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy" (emphasis added)).
180. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate
Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 53 (detailing the problems with generating clear proximate cause
jurisprudence given conflicting policy goals); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic
Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1314-15
(2000) (discussing the difficulty of remedying domestic violence policies because of conflicting
policy goals).
181. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
695, 711-13 (2008) (discussing how multi-goal statutes require balancing multiple goals rather
than prioritizing one).
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1. Pick-a-Policy, Any Superiority Policy
Class actions trigger sentiments about regulation,18 2 tort
reform,18 3 and trial attorneys.18 4 As these larger debates rage through
the courts of public perception, the same debates seep into superiority
decisions.185 Judges can select from one of the stated policies-allowing
their own attitudes about class actions to chart the unmarked terrains
of the requirement.186
By prioritizing different policies, courts can reach contrary
superiority interpretations. Judges more supportive of class actions
focus on effectuating legal rights, avoiding a multiplicity of suits, or
enhancing private enforcement-goals that support generously
defining superiority. 18 7 For judges more wary of class actions, autonomy
and efficiency considerations offer a way to interpret superiority
restrictively. 188
Harkening back to Part I, the policy lens the court adopts
explains the three chief areas of disagreement. For example, take
conflicting judicial conclusions about monetary recovery.18 9 Judges
182. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1141-42 (2012) (discussing the intersection between
class actions and private regulation).
183. Critics of tort reform often also take aim at class actions. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell,
Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional
Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1903 (2008) ("CAFA was a direct product of the 'tort reform'
movement.").
184. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 670 n.3 (1986) (noting "the frequency with which judicial opinions favoring
new restrictions on the availability of clacc actionc or other rnmqdior criticize the plainfiff'
attorney"); see also Nicholas Lemann, The Newcomer: Senator John Edwards is This Season's
Democratic Rising Star, NEW YORKER 58, 82 (May 6, 2002) (detailing the current trend of
negatively depicting class action trial attorneys).
185. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 117-18 (2003)
("Additionally the judiciary itself has, on more than one occasion, oxproccod disdain for plaintiff
class action attorneys.").
186. Judge Posner uses the term "occasional legislators" to characterize the role judges play
in the absence of clear rules. RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 5 (2008).
187. See, e.g., Romero v. La Revise Assocs., L.L.C., 58 F. Supp. 3d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
Phillips v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 00-4275, 2002 WL 34592201, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2002).
188. See, e.g., Taddeo v. Am. Invsco Corp., No. 2:08-CV-01463-KJD-RJJ, 2011 WL 3957392,
at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 7, 2011); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 225 F.R.D. 14, 23 (D. Mass. 2004).
189. Compare Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988)
(certifying action involving six figure and million dollar recoveries, plus remand to determine
punitivc damages for absent class mombors), with Berthor v,. TSYS Total Debt Mgmt. Inc., No. 06-
C-293, 2007 WL 1795472, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2007) (finding "no reason to conclude that a
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favoring autonomy narrowly define the individuals' interests factor: the
amount of individual recovery that triggers inferiority is lower. For
judges favoring private enforcement or access to courts, the amount is
higher.
Judicial approaches to questions of choice similarly turn on
policy decisions. For example, the alternative methods analysis hinges
on whether judges select autonomy concerns over private enforcement
and right to access. Judges focused on autonomy define relevant
alternative methods more broadly, as such alternatives increase
individuals' abilities to elect from different ways to resolve claims. 190
Judges favoring private enforcement define such alternatives narrowly,
focusing more on the gains of collective action and the challenges of
individual litigation against well-funded corporate defendants. 191
Conflicting policy goals also explain the tension over judicial
resources, particularly for manageability. If efficiency and autonomy
concerns trump, case management options like bifurcation are less
likely to overcome management difficulties-thus making superiority
hard to establish. 192 For a judge basing the analysis on enforcement or
right of access, though, the degree of unmanageability must be high to
overcome the enforcement gain.193 Thus, the tension between the aims
of the superiority requirement explains each area of judicial dissonance.
maximum recovery of $1,000 would be insufficient to motivate an individual plaintiff to pursue
private litigation" and that individual litigation may be superior to class litigation where
maximum class recovery is $10 per member).
190. See, e.g., In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 700 (N.D. Ga.
2008).
191. See, e.g., Allen v. Hyland's Inc., 300 F.R.D. 643, 671-72 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Similarly, for
ascertainability, decisions splinter over efficiency and enforcement goals. Compare Marcus v.
BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining the ascertainability
requirement eliminates serious administrative burdens by "insisting on the easy identification of
class members'), with Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (rejecting a strict ascertainability requirement because otherwise "there would be no such
thing as a consumer class action").
192. See, e.g., Barry v. S.E.B. Serv. of N.Y., Inc., No. 11-CV-5089 (SLT)(JMA), 2013 WL
6150718, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2013) (finding inefficiency challenges posed by individual issues
make the certification inferior without consideration of management tools); Brinker v. Chi. Title
Ins. Co., No. 8:10-CV-1199-T-27AEP, 2012 WL 1081182, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012) (same); cf.
Legge v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., No. CV 02-8676DSF(VNKX), 2004 WL 5235587 (C.D. Cal. June
25, 2004) ("Courts bear a significant responsibility to insure that the great power wielded by
plaintiffs (or more accurately their counsel) carrying the cudgel of a class action is used only in
appropriate cases.").
193. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir.
1990) (rejecting manageability challenges, given "enforcement, deterrence or disgorgement"
functions of the pending class claim); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322, 356 (E.D.
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Beyond the divides from Part I, indiscriminate policy selection
also explains why superiority lacks intrasubstantive, let alone
transsubstanive, application. Even within a single area of law,
superiority depends on which policy goal a court selects. Perhaps the
starkest example of this is in antitrust class actions. 194 Differing judicial
ideologies on the role of private enforcement crop up, with some courts
recognizing such actions as mechanisms for enforcement and
deterrence. 195 This viewpoint often corresponds with a broader
definition of superiority. 196 For example, the court in In re Cement
focused on the benefits of price-fixing class actions. 197 As the court
noted, "The public at large will likewise benefit from a class action and
expeditious adjudication of the issues involved since class actions
'reenforce the regulatory scheme by providing an additional deterrent
beyond that afforded either by public enforcement or by single-party
private enforcement.' "g198
In contrast, other courts view private enforcement as a
questionable consequence of class actions. For example, In re Hotel
Pa. 1976) (finding certification furthers private enforcement, thus superiority exists "when only
speculative manageability difficulties are perceived").
194. That said, this divide also applies in other substantive claims, such as in cases regarding
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2012). Compare Nadeau v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. 10-4356 (PAM/JSM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49648, at *12 (D. Minn. April 26, 2011)
(defining superiority broadly), with Kindor v. Nw. Bank, 278 F R.D. 176, 185 -86 (W.D. Mich. 2011)
(defining superiority narrowly).
195. See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 911 F. Supp. 2d 857, 870 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (discussing "vigorous private antitrust enforcement" as a policy goal in antitrust class
actions); Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218-219 (D.D.C.
2007) (noting the "punitive and deterrence goals" of the Sher man Aiihti ubL AL), bep ulso Joshua
P. Davis, Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust
Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REV. 1, 25 (2013) (providing an empirical case for antitrust class actions'
deterrence and private enforcement efficacy).
196. See, e.g., In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 302 F.R.D. 339, 353 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
(finding superiority boecause "a class action device enables individual direct purchators to pursun
their claims in an economically feasible manner, with greater efficacy in achioving onfercomont
and deterrence goals and with greater bargaining power for settlement purpoco"); In re Relafon
Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 260, 287 (D. Mass. 2004) ('"The Advisory Committee's core concern
[with the right to access] was particularly compelling here, whore protection of the public dopondc
upon vigorous private enforcement of state laws but the small size of individual claims ronderc
such enforcement unlikely.").
197. In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1334, *3 (D.
Ariz. 1979).
198. Id. (quoting Hackett v. Gen. Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972)); see also In re
Processed Egg, 302 F.R.D. at 352-53 ("[W]hen 'each consumer has a very small claim in relation
to the cost of prosecuting a lawsuit ... , a class action facilitates spreading of the litigation costs
among the numerous injured parties and encourages private enforcement of the
statutes.' "(citation omitted)).
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Telephone Charges involved nationwide class claims of price-fixing
against hotel chains. 199 In finding a lack of superiority, the court focused
on how time consuming litigation would be for the judiciary relative to
the minimal individual recovery. 200 The court rejected deterrence
benefits, stating: "[T]he Congressional scheme does not contemplate
that private attorneys are to act as prosecutors to force antitrust
violators to disgorge their illegal profits in the general interest of society
at large."20 1 While this conclusion directly contradicts In re Cement-
and a great deal of other authority2 2-it also leads to a notably more
restrictive superiority definition.
Thus, rather than a clear threshold that applies consistently-
at a minimum in a single substantive area-superiority's contours ebb
and flow with the particular ideology a judge imports. The resulting
lack of consensus is unsurprising, though no less troubling.
2. Undefined Efficiency and the Superiority Problem
Just as judges focus on different policy goals, concepts of
efficiency spur further divergent rule interpretation. 20 3 Rule 23(b)(3)
instructs courts to evaluate if certification is a superior method for
"fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy," though fails to
define efficiency-a problem given the term's multiple meanings. 20 4 The
meaning of efficiency varies by the decisionmaker: some apply a "rough
199. In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1974).
200. See id. at 90-92.
201. Id. at 92.
202. See, e.g., Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
546 (l95') ("CQngrosc oeught to create a private enforcement mechanism that would doter
violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample
compensation to the victims of antitrust violations." (quoting Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S.
465, 472 (1982))).
203. See, e.g., Tardiffv. Knox Cnty., 365 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (recognizing that "the balance
of cost and benefit doubtless varies from case to case"); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227
F.R.D. 65, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (recognizing that "[a]ny consideration of superiority... [is]
subjoctivo; it must woigh the bonofits and costs of allowing the class action to proceed vcrsuo the
benefits and costs of individual adjudication").
204. Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF.
L. REV. 509, 516 (1991) (describing economic efficiency as a "notorious exampIc" of ambiguity);
James M. Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, 2 J.L. &
ECON . 124, 126 (1959) (" 'Efficioncy'. . is meaningloss without somo common denominator, some
value scale, against which possible results can be measured.").
13272016]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
economic" analysis; others adopt a strict cost-benefit evaluation. 2 5 Both
views tempt erratic superiority interpretations.
Even roughly defined, efficiency depends on perspective.
Namely, efficiency for whom: (1) the judiciary facing years of complex
and time-consuming litigation, (2) the plaintiffs depending on such
litigation as the only realistic option for recourse, or (3) the defendant
benefiting from any classwide preclusive effect though facing much
greater exposure than in individual litigation?206  If all three
considerations should be balanced, how? The rule provides no key to
answer these questions.
Hence, regardless of whether efficiency is defined broadly or
narrowly, the term only adds to the confusion over superiority. Strict
cost-benefit analyses generate different questions than rough
efficiency. 20 7 Which variables count, and what trade-offs still align with
fairness and justice? Should the judicial resources expended depend on
the case's value? If so, how should value be defined: Do only monetary
judgments count, or should other potential gains, such as information
sharing, be included even if harder to quantify?208 What about trade-
205. Compare In re Netbank, Inc., Sec. Litig., 259 F.R.D. 656, 667 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (noting that
"[tihe key to certifictinn of a clags undor Rul 1 23(b)(3) ie; wbether the efficiency and ecnnmy nf
class adjudication outwcighs the difficultieo and complexity of individual adjudication" (citations
omitted)), and Bone, supra note 176, at 657-58 (describing superiority and predominance as just
"rough ways to measure the benefits of class treatment"), with Lane v. Pago, 272 F.R.D. 558, 580
(D.N.M. 2011) (noting that class action certification is appropriate in cases like securities fraud
actions where "the costs of litigation would likely outweigh any benefit obtained" (quoting In re
Ribozyme Pharms., Inc., Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 572, 579 (D. Colo. 2001))). This approach revives a
previously abandoned amendment to superiority from 1966 to (1) alter the requirement to consider
if the putative class was "necessary" rather than "superior," (2) add a cost benefit analysis, and (3)
eliminate the (b)(3) inquiry for cettlement classes. See PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CLASS ACTION
RULE ADVISORY COMMIT'TEE ON CIvIL RULES (Published for Notice and Comment, Aug. 15, 1996);
John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23-What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L.
REV. 323, 364 (2005). After a groundswell of criticism of the cost-benefit amendment, the
Subcommittee withdrew the proposal in its entirety. See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Beyond 't Just Ain't Worth It" Alternative Strategies for Damages Class Action Reform, LklW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2001, at 137, 141.
206. This list may be underinclusive. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760 (3d
Cir. 1971) ("Superiority muot be looked at from the point of view (1) of the judicial system, (2) of
Lh potential clA66 lufule.16 b , (3) uf th. present plaintiff, (4) of the attorncy3 for the litigants, (5) of
the public at large and (6) of the defendant; The listing is not necessarily in order of importance of
the respective interest-. Superiority must also be looked at from the point of view of the issues.").
207. See Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in
Class Action Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 68 (2010) ("Opponents of the class
action mechanism believe that the harms acsociated with claso actiono outweigh their benefits ....
Conversely, proponents of class actions believe that the social benefits outweigh the costo.").
208. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109,
1189 (2011) ("[M]easuring deterrence and thus quantifying optimal deterrence is nearly
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offs in terms of other cases the court cannot hear during the pendency
of the claim? 20 9 Even if these initial hurdles are cleared, how much
benefit must exceed cost is unclear: Is one cent enough? 210
Given these unanswered queries, a cost-benefit approach
requires courts to exercise value judgments. 211 For some courts, the only
relevant variables are the cost of litigation versus the potential
recovery, 212 while others include less quantifiable variables, such as
balancing the efficiency of classwide determinations and right of access
gains against manageability challenges. 21 3 This disagreement is
compounded by superiority's instruction to consider efficiency and
fairness coequally. Not only is fairness a concept as nebulous as
efficiency,214 the two are often inversely related. 215 Professor Brian Bix
explains:
It is fair enough to look back in wonder, and some disdain, at a time when legal rules were
evaluated only in terms of some intuitive sense of fairness, with no regard to their
instrumental value (and with certainly no reference to their "efficiency"). At the same
impossible .... "); Luff, eupra note 207, at 88 (discussing the difficulty of measuring non monetary
benefits).
209. See Todd J, Zywicki, A Unanimity Reinforcing 1odcl of Efficiency in the Common Law:
An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number
Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 968-69 (1996) (discussing challenges with
valuation subjectivity).
210. See Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analyses and the Environment, 115 ETHICS 351, 353, 376
(2005).
211. See Patrick C, Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy
Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501, 534 (1997) (recognizing the flaws of the premise "that efficiency
issues can be constructively docidod wholly apart from cubjoctivo value judgment"); Zywcki,
supra note 209, at 976-77.
212. See, e.g., Allen v. Hyland's Inc., 300 F.R.D. 643, 671 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Lane v. Page, 272
F.R.D. 558, 580-81 (D.N.M. 2011).
213. See, e.g., In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Contract
Litig., No. 10-2193-RWZ, 2013 WL 4759649, at *14 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2013). Still others go further,
and narrowly focus on the amount of actual harm (as opposed to statutory harm) suffered versus
the financial impact on the defendant of certification. See, e.g., Azoiani v. Love's Travel Stops &
Country Stores, Inc., No. EDCV 07-90 ODW (OPx), 2007 WL 4811627, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
2007); Soualian v. Int'l Coffee & Tea LLC, No. CV 07-502-RGK (JCx), 2007 WL 4877902, at *3
(C.D. Cal. June 11, 2007).
214. Cf. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 283 (1970) (discussing "the vague and
nebulous concept of 'fairness' "); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of
Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 405 (1999) (stating that "an intuitive sense of fairness is
too vague and unreliable to serve as a basis of legal decision making" (citations omitted)).
215. See Yishai Boyarin, Court Connected ADR a Time of Crisis, a Time of Change, 95AIMQ.
L. REV. 998, 1032 (2012); Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 130 (2009). This tension exists generally in
efficiency and fairness balancing, not just for procedural rules, For eiample, scholars have detailed
this tension in the criminal justice arena. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and
the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 238, 239 (1966).
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time, one may wonder whether there has been an "overcorrection". Of course, if one
acts, it should be with eyes open: aware of the costs (including efficiency costs) ....
However, it is a basic point, long ago conceded by Calabresi and Melamed, that efficiency
will only be one value among many, and that we should be conscious of actual and
potential (and potentially desirable) tradeoffs of less efficiency for more fairness or
justice. 2 16
This struggle to balance fairness and efficiency provides an
alternative explanation for the judicial divides set forth in Part I. In
addressing judicial resources, different efficiency definitions cloud three
factors: (1) pending litigation, (2) alternative methods, and most
extensively, (3) manageability.
First, for the pending litigation analysis, some courts define
efficiency as the absence of other cases, while others see the existence
of such cases as proof that certification is superior. For example, in Arch
v. American Tobacco, the court found a lack of superiority because of
the paucity of tried individual claims. 217 In reaching that conclusion,
the court hinged its analysis on potential inefficiencies: "Even assuming
that the courts will be exposed to many more of these types of ... cases,
a conclusion that certification will save judicial resources is premature
at this stage of the litigation.' "1218
Yet, other courts have certified novel claims, finding a single
resolution of related claims efficient. In Klay v. Humana, the court held
the potential efficiency gains of consolidation made the class superior.219
There, the court explained, if the claim "raises a variety of new or
complicated legal questions, then those questions constitute significant
common issues of law" and their "resolution in a single class-action
forum would greatly foster judicial efficiency and avoid unnecessary,
repetitious litigation. '220 There is no irrefutable, "correct" efficiency
position-just arguments that generate incompatible superiority
interpretations.
Second, for alternative methods of adjudication, efficiency
complicates cases involving overlapping federal and state class actions,
as is evident in two Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") cases. In
216. Brian Bix, Epstein, Craswell, Economics, Unconscionability, and Morality, 19
QUINNIpIAC L. REV. 715, 723 (2000) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
217. Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
218. Id. (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1996)).
219. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008).
220. Id.; see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 726 (4th Cir. 1989) (coordinating novel
claimo provides "a mechanism for deciding expoditioucly, efficiently and relatively inoxponsively
these actions without the delays of individual suits").
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Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete Cutters, Inc.,221 the court found
superiority: "[E]ven with the presence of the FLSA action, individual
plaintiffs could bring an action in state court on the state claims. To
avoid this result, and to further judicial economy, it is desirable to
concentrate the litigation in one forum." 222 In contrast, in Muecke v. A-
Reliable Auto Parts & Wreckers,223 the court held a federal class
inefficient-and thus lacking superiority-where, "[e]ach of those
persons then will be able to pursue on his or her own behalf state law
claims, which cover the very same conduct as the FLSA claim." 224
Third, while efficiency is a thread in multiple superiority factors,
it is at the forefront of manageability. 225 Efficiency considerations risk
reverse engineering, much like the rule's differing policy goals. 226 For
example, courts that add a strict ascertainability requirement to
manageability frequently only focus on the heavy efficiency burden of
identifying class members. 227 Such one-sided analyses mean a class is
rarely superior. 228 Others balance such challenges against the gains of
a class and the potential unfairness of precluding certification-leading
to differing superiority decisions.2 29
Thus, superiority's reference to efficiency is a key piece to the
interpretation puzzle. Judges cannot objectively define efficiency, let
alone balance it against the equally elusive concept of fairness. This
221. No. 00 C 5755, 2000 WL 1774091, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2000).
222. Id.; accord O'Brien v. Encotech Const. Servs., Inc., 203 F.R.D. 346, 350 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
("Wcre plaintiffs to file multiple claims undor multiple laws in multiple fora, prooiouc judicial
resources would be wasted on duplicative lawsuits. This result would be inefficient.").
223. No. 01 C 2361, 2002 WL 1359411, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2002).
224. Id.
225. See supra Part I.B (detailing judicial disagreement over (b)(3)(D)).
226. See supra Part I.A; cf. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 129, at 41 (2013) ("[P]rocedural
doctrines that reduce workload have only a short-run effect in curbing ideological judging.").
227. Accord In re Worldcom, Inc., 343 B.R. 412, 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); see, e.g., Boca
Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 238 F.R.D. 679, 686 (S.D. Fla. 2006), affd sub
nom. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 582 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2009).
Overburdened dockets may also contribute to this narrow definition. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro,
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 322-24 (1977)
(reporting statistics that confirm courts are overburdened, impacting the quality of justice).
228. See, e.g., In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. ML 10-02199 DDP (RZx), 2014 WL 1225184, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014); Franks v. MKM Oil, Inc., No. 10 CV 00013, 2012 WL 3903782, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2012) (denying superiority because identifying class members would be
"burdensome" without balancing those burdens against gains of certification).
229. Compare Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 09 CV 395(DLI)(RML), 2013 WL 7044866, at
*21 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013) (balancing judicial access gains against aoortainability challengoo
to find a lack of superiority), with Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal. 2013)
(balancing access and burden to find superiority despite ascertainability challenges).
2016] 1331
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only worsens the indifferent rule drafting, insufficient judicial review,
and conflicting policy goals underlying the superiority requirement.
Considered collectively, these explanations pave a clearer path to
curing this troubled area of civil procedure doctrine.
III. THE ROAD AHEAD
While Parts I and II explored the extent and roots of the
problems, Part III focuses on the needed fix: striking the superiority
requirement from Rule 23.230 Rewritten, Rule 23(b)(3) would read: "A
class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: . . . (3)
the court finds that questions of law or fact common Lo class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.
Adjudication of those questions shall be handled through case
management tools."
This Part unpackages and defends this proposal. First, it makes
the case for striking superiority in toto. Second, it discusses how other
procedural rules can answer the policy concerns and legal questions
that arise under superiority, offsetting the need for a second inquiry.
Instead, courts can focus on strengthening existing case management
tools. Third, this Part defends the proposal against the most anticipated
criticism-the need for procedural screening. With the details spelled
out and the counterarguments rebutted, this solution remedies the
inferiority of superiority.
A. The Case for Rethinking Superiority
From its lack of a clear design to its conflicting purposes, the
superiority requirement fails to clearly and consistently guide
certification decisions. Eliminating the requirement is the only
functional solution.231 Existing interpretations raise concerns about
judicial overreach and endanger judicial access.
230. Perhaps recognizing some of these problems, the Rule 23 Subcommittee is reassessing
superiority. Though in its infancy, a current proposal would only remove the superiority analysis
for settlement classes. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIvLL RULEs, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 11-20
(April 9-10, 2015). This Article argues the proposal should be broadened to remove the superiority
requirement altogether.
231. While this Article does not focus on institutional choice, the Rules Committee, rather
Lhan the Supreme Couit, should iet ise the Rule. Fii'st, the cuiteit rulemaking process for a federal
civil procedure rule involves seven stages of comment and review, of which Supreme Court review
is but one. This multi-stage process (authorized by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012))
"dues it cuiitemplate that the Court could [altui a iole] outside Lhe 'ulemaking structaue." SiUuve,
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The Rules Enabling Act sets the outer limits of permissible
interpretations of procedural rules. 232 While courts can design "a
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law,"233 they cannot construe procedural rules to "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right."234  But existing
interpretations of superiority, such as the presumption that novel
claims are unmanageable, do abridge substantive law in two ways.
First, if prior class actions must exist, the causes of action that can be
certified become a closed universe. Such circular reasoning effectively
adds a class action preclusion to abridge existing substantive law.
Second, superiority interpretations that preclude class actions
outright for certain legal theories abridge plaintiffs' ability to enforce
their substantive rights. Such interpretations limit plaintiffs to
individual suits, thus foregoing the benefits of collective actions, 235 such
as sharing costs, counsel, and information about the defendants' alleged
wrongdoing. 236 Without such benefits, it is often unrealistic for
Gupra note 161, at 1103-04, 1129 (summarizing the Court's limited role in the rulemaking process).
Thus, this approach rospects the democratic participatory proces already in place. Second, when
the Supreme Court has stepped into a quasi legislating role to rovise other procedural rules, the
results have increased confusion, rather than predictability or clarity. See, e.g., Jill Curry &
f.VI I ) Wr,,,l, Are. Tw-d))l]y & Iqh/l tig Whei VIu,, hfff., Filr? A Ptuly Comp, rir, g R-,. , ,,I
Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 827, 831 (2013) (discussing how the Court's revised pleading
requirements caused lower court confusion). Third, recent Supreme Court class action
jurisprudence suggests the majority of the Court will not consider the countervailing gains class
actions provide should it address superiority. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Wo a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of
Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.").
232. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (explaining how neither Congress
nor the federal courts have "power to declare subetantive rules of common law applicable in a state
whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of
torts").
233. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., PA. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010)
(quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) (providing that the "Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts" and "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right").
235. Sec Christine P. Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROoK.
L. REV. 743, 781 (2015), Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class
Action Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 719, 719 (2006); Darren Carter, Notice and the Protection of
Class Members'Interests, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1996).
236 See Bartholomew, supra note 235; at 784. Individual litigation is so unlikely for small
sum cases that defendants have agreed to class action settlements that only preclude the right to
participate in future class or aggregate claims, leaving open the potential for individual suit. See,
e.g., In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 741 F.3d 811, 811 (7th Cir. 2014). As Professor Rave
enplaino: "An ultimately cheaper route to resolving [defendant's] liability might be to purchase the
class members' rights to proceed on an aggregate basis, allowing individual plaintiffs to go at it
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individual consumers to take on large, well-funded corporate
defendants. 237
This judicial overreach disproportionately jeopardizes small
sum cases-the very cases the Rules Committee sought to empower by
adopting Rule 23(b)(3). 238 As Judge Posner notes, "only a lunatic or a
fanatic" would bring such cases individually. 239 Nonetheless, some
decisions deny certification specifically because the amount at stake is
minimal. For example, in Ramirez v. Dollar Phone Corp.,240 the Eastern
District of New York denied class certification for a group of low-income,
non-English-speaking immigrant calling-card consumers. 241 The court
held that because consumers suffered small individual damages, a class
was not superior to other avenues of redress, such as legislative
action. 242
Thus, more sweeping reform is needed to starve the growth of
further interpretative dissonance. Any more modest approach will not
suffice. Creating a hierarchy amid the various superiority factors or
focusing on a sole factor would leave in place the morass of conflicting
interpretations, including those that run afoul the Rules Enabling Act
or place small stake claims at risk.
B. Reabsorbing Superiority
Eliminating superiority makes sense for a second reason. As it
presently stands, the judiciary is unchecked, guessing at which
interpretations to apply. Such guesswork is unnecessary. As detailed
below, other procedural rules have matured during superiority's
duration. Most notably, the two policy concerns behind the more
restrictive definitions of superiority-efficiency and autonomy-are
already addressed by current interpretations of the predominance
requirement. As previously explained, 243 to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)
"questions of law or fact common to clqss members [must] predominate
alone if they so choose, but knowing full well that moot plaintiffs won't bother." D. Theodore Rave,
When Peace is Not the Goal of a Class Action Settlement, 50 GA. L. REv. 475, 477 (2016).
237. Rave, supra note 236.
238. Statement, supra note 21, at 7.
239. Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
240. 668 F. Supp. 2d 448, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
241. Id.
242. Id. ("In the present case, the only adequate and appropriate way to protect the rights of
the Rule 23(b)(3) class is through regulation and enforcement by a federal administrative
agency.').
243. See supra Part I (explaining predominance).
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over any questions affecting only individual members.."244 Efficiency-
however defined-is at the core of this predominance inquiry.245 When
issues of law or fact are shared amongst class members, resolving the
claims collectively is more efficient than a series of individual cases.
246
Inversely, a lack of shared issues necessarily means collective
treatment does not preserve resources as compared to individual
litigation, and thus is inefficient. 247 This relationship makes a second
efficiency inquiry under superiority superfluous.
Similarly, predominance absorbs autonomy questions.
Autonomy concerns parallel individual issues: the more individual
issues, the more legitimate the worries about individuals wanting
decisionmaking control.248 But when collective issues predominate,
such autonomy concerns are fewer. 249 They are offset by the gains of
collective action.250 This is particularly true for small-stakes cases.2 51 As
Professor David Marcus explains, claims that cannot realistically be
litigated outside a class action "may not deserve or even enjoy the sort
of due process protection that places a premium on individual
autonomy."252 In a case that satisfies predominance, individual choice
244. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
245. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendment
(explaining the goal of rubdivision (b)(3) to "achievo oconomioc of time, effort, and oxponco");
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615-16 (1997); Moore v. Stellar Recovery, Inc., No.
13 C 2294, 2014 WL 3509729, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014) ('Predominance is a question of
efficiency."); CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 109, at § 4:49.
246. See Bloom, supra note 235, at 719; Carter, supra note 235, at 1121.
247. See, e.g., Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006 n.12 (11th Cir. 1997)
(discussing how predominance and efficiency are "intertwined"); Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX
Energy Prod., LLC, 306 F.R.D. 312, 394 (D.N.M. 2015).
248. Sec Bartholomew, supra note 235, at 784; Bloom, -upra noto 235, at 719; Carter, supra
note 235, at 1121.
249. Cf. Jon Romberg, The Hybrid Class Action as Judicial Spork: Managing Individual
Rights in a Stew of Common Wrong, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 231, 239 (2006) (discussing the
relationship between predominance in (b)(2) classes and autonomy).
250. Sce id. at 288 (discussing how predominance balances questions of individual choice with
efficiency). How much weight to afford autonomy concerns seems inversely related to the amount
at issue. See Erbsen, supra note 104, at 1008 n.17 (discussing how autonomy interests carry little
or no weight where "economic value of plaintiffs' claims is small relative to the defendant's
aggregate stakes in the litigation, such that plaintiffs would likely be unable to litigate ... outside
of a class action').
251. See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1082 (2012)
("A plaintiff with a small claim has no incentive to bring suit or, for that matter, to defoct from a
class action.").
252. David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1990 (2008).
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is still preserved through notice and opt-out procedures, 253 further
minimizing any lingering autonomy unease. With autonomy and
efficiency accounted for, a second round of screening under superiority
is unwarranted. Bringing this overlap to light further supports
removing the troublesome superiority requirement. 254
1. How Predominance Answers Superiority
In addition to addressing autonomy and efficiency concerns, the
predominance analysis also subsumes superiority's individuals'
interest factor and manageability inquiries. First, the individuals'
interest analysis under Rule 23(b)(3)(A) frequently focuses on the
amount at stake.25 5 The greater the amount, the more courts presume
such interests. 256 However, this is a false proxy.257 Whether someone
would actually sue is too dependent on individual whims.
Predominance removes some of this subjectivity. The quantum
of shared issues of law and fact become the proxy for gauging
individuals' interests. 258 The greater the degree of predominance, the
more likely individuals' interests give way to the benefits of
certification. 25 9 This is also why predominance intersects with
autonomy.260 Thus, there is no need for courts to rely on superiority's
amount at stake or other equally questionable substitutes to evaluate
individuals' interests.
Second, predominance also resolves manageability. Removing
the manageability analysis cures the "largely unfounded belief that
253. See, e.g., Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., 307 F.R.D. 508, 532 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing
npt-o,,t nptions); Klambergv. Roth, 472 F Supp. 544, 559 (S D)N V. 1979) (garne).
254. As an important clarification, courts should carefully conscribe the interpretations of
these other procedure rules. Otherwise, eliminating superiority would just shift the existing strife
onto other factors.
255. See, e.g., Pipefitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 654 F.3d 618, 628
(6th Cir. 2011) (focusing (b)(3)(A) analysis on whether class members are able to pursue claims
individiually): In. re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 523 (D.N.J.
1997) (same); In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 732 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
256. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendment.
257. See Herkert v. MRC Receivables Corp., 254 F.R.D. 344, 352-53 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
258. Accord Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013); see
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring common questions "predominate over any questions affecting
only individual [class] members").
259. See WRIGHT, supra note 57, at 518-19 ("[T]he predominance test really involves an
attempt to achieve a balance between the value of allowing individual actions to be instituted so
that each person can protect his own interests and the economy that can be achieved by allowing
a multiple party dispute to be resolved on a class action basis,"); Romberg, supra note 219, at 288.
260. See infra Part III.A.
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district courts cannot handle ... [complex] class actions...
[recognizing instead that it] takes some elbow grease and some
creativity, but it is not impossible" to manage such claims.26 1 Any
complex litigation undoubtedly will generate judicial hardship, but that
alone is a faulty basis for denying judicial access. 262 Predominance sets
limits on the potential challenges a court must address in a class
action. 263 When a putative class action satisfies the requirement, 26 4 the
resulting manageability challenges should be tolerated. Conversely,
when common issues do not predominate, courts generally agree
manageability is a problem. 26 5
This Article's proposal seeks to expand and to codify this
relationship. 26 6 In doing so, it builds on the approach already taken by
261. Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 306 F.R.D. 312, 461 (D.N.M. 2015).
262. See, e.g., James D. Hinson Elec. Contracting Co. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 275
F.R.D. 638, 648 (M.D. F1A. 901 1) (explaining th-At m-snmgohility issues are "intrinsir in lqrgp rl'qi
action" and tbus not enough to deny suIpprinrify wrhen prerinminqnce i' ,tiied); John , mnyrq,
Jr., Class Action "Fairness"-A Bad Deal for the States and Consumers, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493,
493 (2003).
263. See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 604 (5th Cir. 2006); Stalley
v. ADS All. Data Sys., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 670, 686 (M.D. Fla. 2013) ("the predominance analysis has
a tremendous impact on the superiority analysis" (citation omitted)); Bevrotte ex rel. Bevrotto v.
Caesars Entm't Corp., No. CIV.A. 11-543, 2011 WL 4634174, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2011)
("predominance and superiority.., are intertwined"); Shelley v. AmSouth Bank, No. CIV.A.97-
1170-RV-C, 2000 WL 1121778, at *8 (S.D. Ala. July 24, 2000), aff'd, 247 F.3d 250 (11th Cir. 2001)
("superiority analysis is 'intertwined' with predominance analysis"). Even the Supreme Court
fused the two, suggesting a more careful predominance inquiry in eases whore "individual stakos
are high and disparities among class members great." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 625 (1997).
264. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
265. Ginsburg v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns Mgmt. LLC, No. C11-1959RAJ, 2013 WL 1661483,
at *8 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2013) ("[Beeauoe of the individualized issues on which class members'
claims would ultimately depend, a class action would be unmanageable.").
266. Using predomlnance to Q vqluAtP. tbe underlying concerns of superinrity is qnqlogical tn
the approach advocated in Professor Jay Tidmarsh's work. Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity,
107 Nw. U. L. REV. 565, 566-67 (2013). This essay advocates for an alternative framework for
evaluating ceortification baTed on what Tidmarsb coins thp "slipprinrity prinpip]o " Tbis prinriplo
is a means for assessing class cohesion and is distinct from the superiority factors analyzed in this
Article. Rather than the current multi-factor Rule 23 analysis, he argues certification should turn
on whether the claims asserted are sufficiently cohesive. See id. at 585. Interestingly, though, the
proposed principle is akin to predominance, not superiority. As Tidmarsh points out, a unity of
intcrcts exists when "all classes ... possess a unity of interest along one of the three clements of
a claim (facts, law, or remedy) and a substantial overlap of interest along the other two elements"
Sce id. This abbreviated summary gives short shrift to Professor Tidmareh'e more provocativo
discussion of how to balance individual autonomy concerns and judicial redress goals. However,
the endpoint of his argument matches this Article's refraining of superiority.
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some courts.267  Revising Rule 23(b)(3)'s language to focus on
predominance and foregoing a separate manageability analysis checks
outlier district courts that deny certification simply because such cases
are time-consuming. 26 8
Take, for example, the judicial splits over whether choice of law
questions preclude manageability, as discussed in Part I. Predominance
determinations already overlap with choice of law questions. 269 When
the law governing the claims asserted is too diffuse, predominance will
not be satisfied. Eliminating manageability avoids a second forum for
duplicative, potentially conflicting analysis.
That said, using predominance to absorb superiority poses some
issues. Courts differ on just how many common questions are necessary,
as well as how to define class cohesion. 270 However, in resolving these
open questions, district courts have recent Supreme Court
guidance 271-something missing in superiority. 272 Further, appellate
courts to date have weighed in on predominance more than
superiority. 273  This guidance restrains the range of possible
predominance interpretations, unlike the ever-splintering superiority
analyses. It also supports this Article's proposal to eliminate the
267. At least eight circuits already have such a presumption. Fraser v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
No. 2:13-CV-00520-TLN-DAD, 2014 WL 7336673, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2014); see also MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, Part I § 1.43 n.72 (1977) ("[D]ismissal for management reasons, in view
11r Ibe pibliu jnere iivolvpd in "lass actions,, 01,ld be the exception rather than the rule.").
268. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Dex-Cool Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 305, 314 (S.D.
Ill. 2007) (recognizing the value of certifying an issue class but denying certification in part because
of its "crowded docket").
269. Compare In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015-
19 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiffs must be governed by one state law), with In re Nigeria
Charter Flights Contract Litig., 233 F.R.D. 297, 305-06 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that courts may
apply the laws of multiple states in one class action).
270. See, e.g., Claire E. Bourque, Liability Only, Please-Hold the Damages: The Supreme
Court's New Order for Class Certification, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 695, 708 (2015) (discussing the
current confusion over how to define predominance).
271. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); Amgen Inc. v. Conn.
Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013).
272. See supra Part II.A (discussing the lack of judicial review for superiority).
273. See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2015); EQT Prod. Co. v.
Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 366 (4th Cir. 2014); In re Johnson, 760 F.3d 66, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Abdullah
v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2013); Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
718 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2013); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 814
(7th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357-59 (11th Cir. 2009); In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008); Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay
LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 535 (6th
Cir. 2008); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2008); Monreal v. Potter,
367 F.3d 1224, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004).
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requirement and to remove a second round of questioning about
individuals' interests and manageability.
2. Remaining Inquiries and Procedural Alternatives
While predominance absorbs much of the superiority
requirement, other procedural rules-including other parts of Rule
23-also abrogate the remaining superiority factors. To begin, the
Judicial Multidistrict Litigation Proceeding ("MDL") process makes the
pending litigation and forum factors unnecessary. 274 Two years after
adding the superiority requirement, Congress created the MDL process,
under which civil actions sharing common questions are coordinated
and then transferred to a single judicial district for pretrial purposes.275
The MDL process only applies to federal cases. By expanding federal
diversity jurisdiction in 2005,276 the Class Action Fairness Act
effectively enlarged the reach of the MDL process. 277 The MDL decision
intersects with the "pending litigation" factor: it results in fewer
pending cases and provides an analysis of consolidation. The
superiority analysis can question that decision, inviting inconsistent
MDL and trial court rulings.
Similarly, the MDL process addresses the appropriate forum. 278
Trial courts undertake this second-guessing under superiority without
sufficient guidance on how to evaluate pending litigation or the
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
275. See id.I see also Scott Paeotty, Claosleas Not Cluelco : A Comparison of Case Management
Mechanisms for Non-Class-Based Complex Litigation in California and Federal Courts, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 845, 848 (2008) (describing the MDL process).
276. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
277. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act
on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723,
1751 (2008) (finding seventy-two percent overall increase in class action activity in the eighty-
eight district courts studied); Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
80 TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1642 (2006) (discussing the intersection between the MDL process and
CAFA'c expanded jurisdiction). For any parallel ctato claims, court. can analyze the impact of such
cases through predominance and manageability.
278. See Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 306 F.R.D. 312, 406 n.56 (D.N.M.
2015) (stating "the court should respect [the MDL] decision and exclude the possibility of
multidistrict litigation from its superiority analysis"); In re Energy Sys. Equip. Leasing Sec. Litig.,
642 F. Supp. 718, 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Factors such as those set forth in Rule 23(b)(3) have
already been considered by the Judicial Panel on Multidiotrict Litigation in determining whether
to transfer the various pending federal cases involving the Systems to this Court ...."); In re S.
Cent. States Bakery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 86 F.R.D. 407, 423 (M.D. La. 1980) (recognizing
overlap between MDL decision and superiority).
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forum. 279 Though many courts apply principled approaches to these
questions,280 some have adopted interpretations that spell the realistic
end for a case.281 Collapsing the superiority analysis and the MDL
process resolves these inconsistencies.
As for the remaining superiority question, alternative methods,
Rule 23 currently addresses this.28 2 Rule 23(a)(4) requires a showing
that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class." 28 3 Some courts already use this requirement to
analyze private methods of resolving a putative claim. For example, in
In re Aqua Dots Products Liability Litigation, the trial court denied
superiority for purchasers of a toxic toy.28 4 While the trial court found
the defendant's limited recalls superior to litigation, the Seventh
Circuit reversed.285 Chief Judge Easterbrook held private remedies
were better addressed under Rule 23(a)(4) than under superiority. 28 6
279. Neither the MDL rules nor Rule 23 provide guidance on the interaction-if any-between
this process and these factors. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
280. See In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 570, 587 (E.D. La. 1976) (recognizing that
post-MDL consolidation, the forum factor is irrelevant).
281. The mere existence of other litigation weighs against superiority, without analysis of the
cane's status or the scope of the claims assertod. See, e.g., Vassalle v. Midland Funding LLC, 708
F.3d 747, 758 (6th Cir. 2013); Real Estate Alliance, Ltd. v. Sarkisian, No. CIV. A. 05-CV-3573,
2007 WL 2814591, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2007).
282. Predominance also address alternative methods of adjudication. If a defendant has
already provided an extensive variety of private rofunds, this impacts whether there are too many
individualized defenses. See, e.g., Vaccariello v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., 295 F.R.D. 62, 74
(S.D.N.Y, 2013) (finding lack of predominance because of individualized defenses based on rebate
program). Lilkewise, if the relief from a concurrently pending administrative action create
individualized damages issues, that, too, impacts predominance. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co.
Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 347 (D.N.J. 1997) (discussing how potential
administrative action impaoto predominance and superiority).
283. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
284. 654 F.3d 748, 749 (7th Cir. 2011).
285. See id. at 751-52.
286. Id. This is not to say, however, that courts should find a class representative inadequate
mcrely because she did not participate in a defendant's private remedy offering (such as a recall).
To the contrary, such private recalls often forego the benefits of collective action, such as
information sharing. See Bartholomew, supra note 235, at 784-86; see also D. Theodore Rave,
Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J. TORT L. 91, 116 (2012) (discussing the risks
associated with private remedies including "less robust" bargaining process though approving of
the ADR program in Aqua Dots). Instead, the point here is subtler: courts are already considering
how to address private remedies under aspects of Rule 23. A soecond diseussion of such offers under
superiority currently serves no consistent screening function, thus making such an analysis not
only unnecessary but problematic.
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Other private alternatives, such as arbitration, are now a basis
for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 28 7 Further,
motions to stay capture overlapping pending government or
administrative actions. 288 Such stays require the actual existence of
pending actions, unlike the superiority analysis by which courts deny
certification based on little more than the hypothetical potential for
such cases. 28 9 After the resolution of such government or administrative
action, the court can decide whether remaining issues, if any,
predominate. 290 If no such issues exist, a motion to dismiss can then be
granted.291
Hence, between the predominance requirement and the
procedural rules above, superiority questions will still be addressed.
Eliminating superiority just cures the problems posed by the
requirement without foregoing judicial resolution of these superiority
questions.
C. Strengthening Case Management
With the superiority factors absorbed elsewhere, only one more
piece is needed to nix superiority: stronger case management tools.
Class actions challenge courts and litigants alike.292 The manageability
factor could provide the judiciary and the parties an opening to chart
the litigation's course. 293 However, the adversarial posture of
manageability hinders planning efforts. Plaintiffs are incentivized to
downplay the challenges of litigating a putative class action while
defendants amplify such potentialities. For the generalist judge, this
287. See, e.g., Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
288. Such stays based on pending government action are required for securities class actions.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
289. See, e.g., Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 292 F.R.D. 252, 283 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding lack of
superiority based on the mere potential for NHTSA to investigate the faulty rear axle design).
290. See, e.g., Cnty. of Stanislaus v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. CV-F-93-5866-OWW, 1994 WL
706711, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 1991) (granting certification deopite public utility administrativo
agency's hearing since it did not fully address the antitrust claims).
291. See, e.g., Wechsler v. Se. Props., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 13, 16 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 506 F.2d 631 (2d
Cir. 1974) (dismissing class claims after resolution of Attorney General action that obtained
sufficient relief).
292. See Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits
of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1692 (1992).
293. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (directing courts to also make determinations on "the likely
difficulties in managing a class action" when considering class certification).
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means the factor invites faulty information about how potential
procedural tools could streamline litigation.
Rather than tinkering to redefine manageability, a better course
of action is to sharpen existing case management tools. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16 already requires a trial plan 294 and empowers courts
to generate "special procedures" for complex cases. 295 The proposal,
here, is to fortify such existing case management tools and require
partial trial plans in advance of class certification. 296 These plans must
be detailed, addressing the utility and limits of case management tools,
ranging from multi-phased trials to subclassing to bifurcation. 297 They
should also address staying or coordinating any pending parallel state
cases.298 If the parties fail to reach consensus, the court can appoint a
294. FED. R. CiV. P. 16(a)(4). Courts should use their power to sanction those who fail to
generate trial plans in bad faith. See Hon. Craig B. Shaffer, "Defensible" by What Standard?, 13
SEDONA CONF. J. 217, 227 (2012) ("[A]n attorney or party that does not participate in good faith in
developing and submitting a proposed discovery plan as requircd by Rulc 26(f) can be rcquircd to
pay the other party's reasonable fees and costs caused by that failure. The same sanctions can bc
imposed on a party or attorney who is substantially unprepared to participate in the Rule 16(b)
scheduling conference." (footnote omitted)).
295. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(L) (authorizing judges to adopt "special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties,
difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems").
296. See, e.g., Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 186 n.7 (3d Cir.
2006) ("[W]e note that ... the pre-certification... trial plans.., could be used.., by the parties
[to] aid[ I trial courts in defining the precise parameters of a given class for certification
purposes."). The remainder of the topics covered in a Rule 16 trial plan would still be submitted
pretrial.
297. See, e.g., In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98, 149 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(discussing potential case management tools available in class actions). Asccrtainability would not
be part of this joint trial plan. Numerosity notice requirements, and Rule 23's requirement that a
certification order "define the class and class claims, issues, or defenses" negate the need for a
separate ascertainabiity inquiry. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). Numerosity already ensures
there is a clear definition of the class. See, e.g., Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 357
(3d Cir. 2013) (illustrating the intersection between ascertainability and numerosity); Knutson v.
Schwan's Home Serv., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-0964-GPC-DHB, 2013 WL 3746118, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July
15, 2013) (same) Unlike superiority, the requirements for class notice are well-defined See FED-
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
298. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing how
impending settlements in federal actions justify staying duplicative state actions); Manning v.
Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 223 (6th Cir. 1988) (staying pending resolution
of parallel state case informally); Gee also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OFAGOREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02
(2010) (promoting judicial communication to resolve manageability issues in parallel state and
federal class actions); cf. William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination
of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1732-33 (1992) (stating
"iitc-5ystcui cooldination has pro-vn cffctive in accoaiplishing Lhe[ ] goals" of promoting
economy, efficiency and consistency).
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special master to assist.299 Further, if unanticipated issues arise during
the litigation, such plans should be revised accordingly.
Parties already have the information necessary for such
planning. 300  Class action attorneys-both for plaintiffs and
defendants--often have significant expertise and understanding of the
frequently encountered issues in such cases. 30 1 In fact, these attorneys
already use this knowledge to generate joint pre-trial case management
and discovery plans. 30 2 Using this expertise to overcome the challenges
of managing a class action expands current collaboration, with the hope
of increasing the efficacy and the quality of judicial decisions. 30 3 Shared
trial manageability strategies could generate a body of creative
solutions to guide the judiciary through class action challenges.
A critic might oppose this proposal, arguing instead for a more
limited approach, such as a presumption of manageability or making
the manageability test less rigorous for small-stake cases. The problem
would remain, however, that such approaches would once again devolve
into arbitrary line-drawing-this time not for what is manageability
but for when the presumption is rebutted. Is it unmanageable if a case
would take years to adjudicate? If so, how many years is too many?
Similarly, is it unmanageable because the case involves the laws of
multiple states? If so, how many states is too many? Courts have
already tried to identify the tolerable quantum of manageability for
class action certification. Just how polarized courts are in defining that
299 See, eg Jack Ratliff, Special Master's Report in Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 10 REV.
LITIG. 521, 521 (1991).
300. Counsel often already generate various plans for clients. See Perry Elizabeth Pearce,
What In-House and Outside Counsel Should Tell Each Other, PRAC. LAW., April 1995, at 29, 30.
Further, some courts already require trial plans, but only from the plaintiff. See Barnes v. District
of Columbia, 278 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing plaintiffs' trial plans); Ancar v. Murphy
Oil, U.S.A., Inc., 2008 WL 2951794, *2 n.8 (E.D. La. July 25, 2008) (same); In re Paxil Litig., 212
FRD 539, 542 (C-D Cal, 2003) (same); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. liab
Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same).
301. See, e.g., Wallace v. Powell, 288 F.R.D. 347, 374 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (detailing how the
counsel has "extensive experience" litigating class actions); In re Am. Investors Life Ins. Co.
Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 263 F.R.D. 226, 235 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (same); J. Douglas
Pctcro & David R. Parker, The Hiotory, Law, and Future of State Claos Actions in Michigan, 41
WAYNE L. REV. 135, 200 (1998) (noting how "the complexity and length of some class actions,
together with the financial risk and up front costs required to maintain class litigation" generate
class action specialists).
302. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3) (describing joint discovery plans); see also Charles W. Sorenson,
Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing?", 46
HASTINGS L.J. 679, 725 (1995) (describing joint discovery plans).
303. These decisions should be published and kept in a repooitory for uoe in subsequent cases.
Such a repository already exists for mass torts. See, e.g., LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES § 10:32.
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baseline shows why even a presumption or a sliding scale of rigor is
unworkable.
Thus, eliminating manageability and instead fortifying case
management tools ensures courts will not screen cases based on
generalized class action hostility. 30 4 With this last piece of the revised
(b)(3) analysis explained, the next step is to debunk the false need for
more class action gatekeeping.
D. Answering Critics: The Questionable Superiority Screen
The most likely criticism of this proposal is that it might make
class certification easier. 30 5 Such criticism overlooks the challenges of
proving predominance. Further, as previously discussed, other
procedural mechanisms will still explore superiority questions. What
the proposal does is clarify the certification analysis while minimizing
the redundant, inconsistent analyses superiority currently affords.
More critically, though, the arguments of those who would
bemoan the loss of superiority's screening potential rest on faulty
premises. First, this potential concern assumes superiority actually is
a serviceable screen.306 However, the problems detailed at length in
Parts I and II prove the requirement lacks sufficient beacons to guide
when access to justice should give way to efficiency. 30 7 For a screen to
properly function, it must first be applied consistently. 308
Second, and perhaps most disconcerting, is the underlying
assumption that more class action screening is needed. 30 9 This
304. See Muehler v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1370, 1375-76 (D. Minn. 1985) ("We
havc now sccn that many judges, openly and un the 1ecord have suspiciun and disdain for class
actions as a means of redress.... Such actions have already gone a long way toward sounding the
'death knell' for class actions.").
305. Critics argue class actions force blackmail settlements, though the hyperbolic nature of
tho attack has already boon oxpood. See Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail
Myth: A New Perspectivc on Clace Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 693 96, 704 (2005)
(domonstrating that "actual sottlomont rates among certified claos actions as well as the
availability of diopositivo motions both undermine thc accuracy of the hydraulic pressure claim").
Thus, this Article focuses more on generalized screening arguments.
306. See supra Part II.B.1 (detailing the convoluted state of superiority screening).
307. See supra Part H.B.2 (listing varying efficiency interpretations).
308. Cf. John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 345 46 (1996) (cxplaining the
PSLRA is a faulty screen because of its inconsistent application).
309. The rationale for more screening through superiority also overlooks how such screening
is not the cost-6aving panacea those seeking judicial efficiency aight hupe fur. See Robert 0. Bone
& David S. Evans, Class Ccrtification and the Substantiec Merits, 61 DuIE L.J. 1281, 1329 (2002)
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assumption overlooks the last three decades of increased screening in
many key areas of law commonly brought as class actions. 310 Such
changes began in the 1980s with the overhaul of Rule 11, followed by
increased summary judgment requirements in 1985.311 In the 1990s,
heightened screening came in different forms, such as the Private
Securities Litigation Act. 312 Since 2000, the screening mantra led to
more radical procedural changes, both legislatively with CAFA and
through a series of Supreme Court decisions. 313 These decisions now
shut out a wide swath of class actions by forcing such claims into private
arbitration. 314 For those that remain, such cases are screened through
heightened pleading31 5 and class certification requirements. 31 6 The
cumulative impact of these procedural screens has not yet been fully
felt, though empirical evidence and qualitative analyses suggest the
effects are significant.31 7 There is no evidence further screening is
needed.
(cxplaining how early screens generate costs of their own, including error costs and increased
process costs).
310. See Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 3244 ("Procedural gatekeeping in class actions is on
the rise."); Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury's Role in the Structure of Our
Government, 55 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1241, 1261 (2014) ("[Justice] Roberts['s] Court decisions have
also restricted access to class action litigation.").
311. Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 521-22 (1997)
(detailing the increasing procedural screening of the 1980s and 1990s); Suzette Malveaux, A
Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its
Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455, 456-57 (2014) (noting the general
increase in procedural hurdles across time).
312. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
313. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-50
(2011); Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
314. See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (enforcing arbitration
provision with class waiver); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (same).
315. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562; cf. Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading
Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2005 (2010)
(discussing how screening through motions to dismiss is particularly quostionablo given the
purpose of Rule 8).
316. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1428-29 (2013); Dukes, 564 U.S. at
349-50.
317. See Miller, supra note 1, at 318 (2013) (discussing how restrictive interpretations of Rule
23 have "chilled much of its innovative application").
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Third, even assuming class actions need more screening, 318
superiority is not the appropriate mechanism. 319 As discussed at length
in Part II.B, screening under superiority depends on the interpretation
a particular judge adopts. 320 Screening mechanisms that employ such
value judgments lack accuracy. One need only consider the recent
change to pleading standards to prove this point. 321 Under Twiqbal, the
Supreme Court heightened the pleading requirement to filter
potentially unmeritorious claims. 322 If this were an effective screen, one
would have expected a corresponding drop of summary judgment
motions after Twiqbal: if more cases were screened out on motions to
dismiss, fewer questionable cases would need to be screened under Rule
318. Such an assumption is questionable. See Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze:
Toward A More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1119 (2013) ("Insofar as this
strict pleading standard already performs a screening function, there might be no need for and
it might not be a good idea to adopt ---a strict certification standard as well.'). This is particularly
true given superiority is part of Rule 23. See Steig D. Olson, "Chipping Away"' The Misguided
Trend Toward Rcolving Merits Disputes As Part of the Class Ccrtification Calculuo, 43 U.S.F. L.
RiRv q25, q.q (?,00) (",awmakers did not intend courts to ,? Ril 9 ,F 9 -creening device; they
provided other, superior, screening mechanisms instead.').
319. For example, take courts that use superiority to screen out cases based on arguments
that the resulting damageF are disproportionate to the actual harm eufforod. See supra Part I.B.1
and accompanying notes. The quantum of damages in such cases is defined statutorily. See, e.g.,
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012) (setting a statutory violation rate of no more
than the lesser of $1,000,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth). Thus, if the damages as
aggregated are disproportionate (a debatable point), the appropriate fix is the substantive
statutory law giving rise to those damages-not through Rule 23. See, e.g., Murray v. GMAC
Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Maybe suits such as this will lead Congress to
nnd the Fair Cfrcdit Reporting Act; maybe not. While a ctqti4 rem.ains on the hooks, however,
it must be enforced rather than subverted."). Any contrary approach inviteo the very problems that
oxist with superiority, namely judicial application of a procedural rule that lacks consistent
transsubstantive application. See supra Part II.A. (explaining why a procedural rule should apply
equally across different substantive claims) and Part III.A. (discussing the Rules Enabling Act and
limits on procedural rule interpretation). Thus, using superiority as a screen creates more
problems than it solves.
320. See supra Part II.B.; see also Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia," or Hard
Cases Can Make Good Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 234 (1962) (discussing the difficulty of judicial
decisionmaking).
321. See Effron, supra note 315, at 2000 ("For nearly fifty years, courts and commentators
viewed the pleading stage as a relatively weak point for the exercise of gatekeeping.").
322. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
562 (2007). Twiqbal replaced the "notice pleading" standard previously in place for the prior fifty
years. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Under Twiqbal, a plaintiff must show not just
a lugally conceivable claim for relif but a factually "plausible" one. Se Iqbul, 556 U.S. aL 679-01
David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 1203, 1248 (2013).
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56.323 Instead, there was no reduction in summary judgments. 324
Rather, the new standard has created grave concerns about false-
positives, striking out cases not based on their potential merit but
rather on a given judge's definition of plausibility. 325
In contrast, merit-based determinations evaluate whether the
evidence supports the substantive claim, unlike procedural
mechanisms which focus on unevenly defined questions of efficiency. 326
Merit-based determinations allow judges to evaluate whether a
particular claim is frivolous based on more than conjecture about what
the evidence might someday prove. This in turn offsets the risk of
chilling potentially legitimate claims.
Thus, even after nullifying superiority, class actions will still be
sufficiently screened. Not every putative class will automatically be
certified. Courts will continue to preclude many claims, just through
other procedural rules or based on merit determinations. These
determinations, though, provide a type of gatekeeping that comes closer
to balancing access and fairness than superiority: plaintiffs have the
potential to air their grievances, and defendants have the benefit of
class-wide issue preclusion should the claims prove meritless. 327 Hence,
this Article's proposal to eliminate the superiority requirement is both
workable and defensible.
CONCLUSION
The superiority experiment has failed. After fifty years, the
judiciary is no closer to deciding when a putative class action is
sufficiently superior to certify under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
323. See JONAH B. GELBACH, MATERIAL FACTS IN THE DISPUTE OVER TWOMBLY AND IQBAL:
USING DEFENSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WIN RATES TO MEASURE THE QUALITY OF CASES AFFECTED
DY IIEIGITENED PLEADING (CELS Version, Nov. 2012) (undertaking an empirical emmination of
the extent to which Twiqbal has affected the merit of cases that proceed past the 12(b)(6) stage).
324. See id. at 9-10.
325. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 556-57 (2010) (dicu33ing how Twiqbal is a seemly transubstantive procedural rule that
works like a substantive one, impacting some causes of action more than others).
326. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 12-14 (2010) (discussing how the current trend towards
rising procedural gatekeeping based on efficiency limits judicial access).
327. See Antonio Gidi, Loneline33 in the Crowd: Why Nobody Wants Opt Out Class Members
to Assert Offensive Issue Preclusion Against Class Defendants, 66 SMU L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2013);
DLU J. Gross, Mandatory Notice and Defendant Class Actions: Rcoolving the Paradox of Identity
Between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 40 EMORY L.J. 611, 616 (1991) (discussing the benefits of
certification).
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23(b)(3). Instead, jurisprudence is plagued with inconsistent
interpretations. The full scale of the problem is only evident after
uncovering how deep these divides run. Each aspect of the superiority
analysis draws more inconsistency, thus threatening not only the rule
of law, but also the ability of parties to predict and plan litigation
strategies. For putative class members, the risks are more pernicious:
inconsistent superiority decisions mean certification depends on the
assigned judge rather than the particularities of a given case. It is
difficult to reconcile such inconsistency with basic principles of fairness,
let alone the predictability aims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
more generally.
Left untreated, the superiority requirement's afflictions will
likely fester. Superiority's interpretative divides are a result of deeply
embedded problems with the crafting of the requirement. Not only does
it lack concrete textual guidance, its underlying, conflicting policy goals
allow courts to define superiority as they please.
Hence, the best treatment for this ailment is eliminating the
requirement and fortifying case management tools. Superiority is an
inferior method for exploring the variety of issues that arise in a class
certification analysis. In place of forcing legal questions into this faulty
framework, courts can instead rely on alternative procedural rules, as
well as other aspects of Rule 23, to resolve these issues. This approach
maintains the rigor of the class certification analysis while starving the
growth of further paradoxical superiority jurisprudence. In doing so, the
botched superiority experiment can finally end.
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